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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is increasingly hoping to employ unmanned 
systems and artificial intelligence to achieve a strategic advantage over adversaries. 
While some tasks may be suitable for machine substitution, many parts of the DoD’s 
mission continue to require boots on the ground and humans in the loop working in 
interdependent human-machine teams. The commercial unmanned systems marketplace 
and active UxS and autonomous systems offer military research and acquisitions 
professionals promising technical solutions, but may integrate poorly in a 
human-machine team application. The authors developed a framework for analyzing 
task-to-technology matches and team design for military human-machine teams. The 
framework is grounded in the cognitive theories of situational awareness and decision 
making, team dynamics, and functional allocation literature. Additionally, the research 
recommends developing a shared DoD-wide understanding of autonomous systems terms 
and taxonomy, and educating operational leaders, acquisitions staff, and executives 
about realistic expectations and employment of autonomous systems in human-
machine environments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and its coalition partners leveraged unmanned systems during 
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM that increased the lethality 
and survivability of the force during these operations. From conducting aviation-based 
persistent reconnaissance and targeting to reducing improvised explosive devices on the 
ground, these systems provide substantial capabilities to the force. These systems require 
at least one human, and sometimes many, to supervise and direct their actions. This model 
does not scale well when trying to employ numerous unmanned systems, however. To gain 
a technological advantage over its adversaries, the Department of Defense (DoD) seeks to 
decouple and unchain machines from requiring human supervision and direction. This 
desire is understandable as machines have certain characteristics that make them more 
capable of certain tasks. Another promising employment option warrants consideration: 
pairing humans and machines as teammates to capitalize on the unique capabilities that 
each brings to bear. Besides employing teams of humans, each of the three fundamental 
employment options has advantages and disadvantages, both cognitive and otherwise, 
which decision-makers must carefully consider before deciding on an approach. 
A. UNMANNED TACTICAL AUTONOMOUS CONTROL AND 
COLLABORATION 
The Unmanned Tactical Autonomous Control and Collaboration (UTACC) 
program was the genesis of this thesis. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) 
recognized that the current construct of one or more humans supervising and directing one 
unmanned system does not facilitate future combat. Hence, the MCWL vision for the 
UTACC program is a “decision-centric, semi-autonomous, distributed” robotic system of 
systems comprised of at least three Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) and at least one 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) controlled by a single human operator working in a 
collaborative team environment (Rice, Keim, & Chhabra, 2015). In its Fiscal Year 2018 
Draft Statement of Work, MCWL stated that its primary objective for the UTACC program 
is to: 
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develop a decentralized multi-UxS manager … [that] will significantly 
minimize operator intervention over current systems and allow the system 
the flexibility required to react to a wide range of operational tasks, 
environmental conditions, and landscapes as based on the real-time needs 
of the operator. (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2017, p. 1)  
The UTACC objective has two major parts in that it seeks a system that not only reduces 
the cognitive burden of directing the system but that can also operate in any clime and 
place. These two parts are at odds with each other because flexible systems are generally 
more complex systems.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
A problem exists with the incorporation of autonomous systems into human-
machine teams during combat operations: it is difficult to determine the cognitively optimal 
number of human and machine agents for a particular task executed in an environment. 
This is a problem because humans and machines each have unique cognitive capabilities 
and limitations, and failure to consider these cognitive attributes could lead to poor mission 
performance. A study that examines the cognitive impact of integrating autonomous 
systems may lead to a deeper understanding of the cognitive and decision-making 
implications for autonomous systems integration. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
The purpose of this research is to increase understanding of how to improve task 
performance by optimizing the cognitive abilities of human-machine teams. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How can designers improve task performance by determining the 
cognitively optimal team to perform the task? 
2. What are the characteristics of human-machine tasks that designers should 
consider?  
3. What is cognitive load? How can it be measured?  
4. How does cognitive load impact decision-making?  
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5. What material and non-material solutions offer warfighter benefits to: 
• Improve decisions quality (efficiency, effectiveness, scope)? 
• Decrease error rates? 
 
E. THESIS DESIGN 
This chapter provides the contextual background information related to the problem 
that this thesis aims to solve. Chapter II of this thesis presents an in-depth review of the 
literature relevant to the problem and its context. Chapter III describes the research 
methodology for analyzing the problem. Chapter IV details the analysis of the problem. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the research’s conclusions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Soon, AI also will become the most potent enabler of competitive advantage 
throughout most areas of our society and economy. 
—Allen and Hussain (2017b)  
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter contains an in-depth review of the body of literature relevant to 
understanding the problem and its context. Initially, this chapter presents and analyzes 
current U.S. strategy as it relates to human-machine teaming and autonomous weapons. 
Second, this chapter reviews autonomy and automation ontology and taxonomy. Third, this 
chapter investigates relevant artificial intelligence (AI) and machine cognition literature. 
Fourth, this chapter conducts a thorough review of applicable human cognition, situation 
awareness, and decision-making. Finally, the chapter surveys pertinent literature regarding 
teaming and team cognition. 
B. THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY  
The military human-machine teaming (HMT) phenomena occurs within the 
construct of military policy and doctrine. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the larger 
policy goals driving the military to develop and employ the autonomous weapons systems 
in combat. The central policy driving the adoption of autonomous weapons systems in the 
United States is the third offset strategy (3OS). 
The lineage of the 3OS traces back to the first offset strategy, which sought to 
negate the Soviet Union’s numerical advantage in troop strength during the Cold War 
through the development of nuclear weapons (Grier, 2016; Martinage, 2014). Realizing 
that the United States could not amass the conventional forces necessary to defeat the 
Soviet Union’s larger conventional military, President Eisenhower issued the “New Look” 
strategy via NSC 162/2 in October 1953 (Lay, 1953). Along with increasing the nation’s 
espionage capabilities, the strategy’s technological underpinnings were the miniaturization 
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of nuclear warheads and the development of the nuclear triad (Grier, 2016; 
Martinage, 2014). 
By the 1970s, the Department of Defense (DoD) needed a second offset strategy as 
the New Look strategy no longer was capable of deterring Soviet aggression without 
damaging the U.S. economy. The Soviet Union had not only matched the United States’ 
nuclear technology but had also exceeded the United States in quantity of nuclear weapons 
(Martinage, 2014). This revelation limited the effectiveness of the New Look strategy to 
deter Soviet aggression. To offset Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities, Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown designed a second strategy to leverage recent advances in 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; precision-guided munitions; 
stealth; and space-based capabilities, such as precision navigation and timing (Martinage, 
2014). Through these technologies, the DoD could conceivably prosecute Soviet 
movements so rapidly and effectively that it would negate the Soviet’s nuclear and 
conventional forces.  
While the United States spent 15 years focused on counterinsurgency operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia closed the technological capability gap developed under the 
second offset. Not only does Russia possess similar military capabilities as the United 
States, Russia has also developed new capabilities. For instance, Russia has cultivated the 
ability to conduct cyber and information operations as evidenced by its cyber attacks 
against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Miller & Kuehl, 2009). 
Additionally, during Russia’s 2014 seizure of the Crimea, Russia executed a deliberate 
misinformation campaign that paralyzed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s ability 
to respond effectively (Wirtz, 2017). Russia has proven itself capable of leveraging the 
cyber domain and information environment for strategic purposes. 
During the past 20 years, China has also heavily invested in military modernization. 
From 1990–2011, China’s annual military spending increased over its prior year’s 
spending by at least 10% in concert with China’s economic growth (Liff & Erickson, 
2013). China is developing capabilities to oppose current U.S. capabilities (Dombrowski, 
2015a). This development has given rise to China’s anti-access/area denial strategy, which 
aims to prevent the United States from projecting power across the Pacific Ocean. In 2007, 
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China successfully tested an anti-satellite, directly threatening the GPS constellation that 
the United States relies on for position, navigation, and timing (PNT); communication; and 
other military functions (Metzler, 2007). China has also heavily invested in its cyber 
capabilities, which the country used to conduct cyber espionage to steal significant military 
and industrial secrets from the United States (Dombrowski, 2015b). China used the stolen 
knowledge to reverse engineer U.S. capabilities, thereby closing the technological gap with 
limited investment in research and development (Dombrowski, 2015a; Mabbett & Kovach, 
2017). 
Recognizing that near-peer adversaries have eroded and negated its technological 
advantage by developing similar or asymmetric capabilities, the DoD identified the need 
to adopt a new strategy to regain a technological advantage. In 2014, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert Work announced the need for a new offset strategy to protect the United 
States’ military advantage (Bertuca, 2014). He envisioned two parts to the strategy. The 
first part of the strategy should seek to obtain additional capabilities from existing 
technology and weapon systems by employing them in new ways (Host, 2015). Second, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Work stated that the 3OS should seek to leverage new and 
emerging technologies to regain the United States’ technological advantage over its 
adversaries. He specifically highlighted autonomous systems, robotics, big data analytics, 
computer vision, and machine learning as technology that could contribute to the 3OS 
(Host, 2015). Unlike the technologies used in the two previous offset strategies, these 
technologies have largely been developed and implemented by private industry for 
commercial application, not for the U.S. military (Host, 2015).  
C. 3OS DOD ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
Implementing the 3OS strategy necessitated changes to DoD organization. To kick-
start implementation of the 3OS, the DoD established the Strategic Capabilities Office 
(SCO) in 2012 (Pellerin, 2016a, 2016b). The SCO’s mission to obtain new capabilities 
from existing combat systems by incorporating new technologies supports the 
implementation of the 3OS against a near-peer adversary. The SCO can field new 
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capabilities more rapidly from fielded weapons than from developing and acquiring new 
weapon systems (Pellerin, 2016c). 
Incorporating machine learning in the DoD required another organization change. 
In April 2017, the DoD established the Algorithmic Warfare Cross Function Team 
(AWCFT), also known as Project Maven. The establishing memorandum charged the 
AWCFT to accelerate the speed that the DoD integrates machine learning and big data 
analytics, specifically in the Intelligence warfighting function (Work, 2017). One area of 
focus for AI integration is that manually analyzing countless hours of full motion video 
(FMV) obtained from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets remains a 
crucial bottleneck in the intelligence cycle. The DoD is looking to employ AI to replace 
human labor currently required to analyze this avalanche of full motion video from sensors 
to expedite data analysis. 
While the DoD pursues advanced technologies via research at the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the National Laboratories, partnering 
with private industry is key to obtaining the technology required to implement the 3OS. 
Many of the advancements in AI and other emerging technologies are a result of significant 
investment by private industry for commercial applications (Mabbett & Kovach, 2017). In 
2015, the DoD established the Defense Innovation Unit (Experimental) in Silicon Valley, 
one of the largest commercial AI research and development hubs, to partner with private 
industry to rapidly source private industry AI solutions to military problem sets (Defense 
Innovation Unit (Experimental), n.d.).  
D. AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS POLICY 
Many science fiction authors have written about a future where wars are fought by 
machines because humans are unable to compete with autonomous machines that are 
smarter and more capable. The DoD and the Marine Corps are shaping the future force 
requirements by establishing policy and warfighting concepts that set the conditions to 
succeed in this type of conflict. 
The development of AI and autonomous weapon systems may fundamentally 
change how militaries fight future wars if properly planned and integrated. Singer (2009) 
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argued that autonomous weapon systems are a disruptive technology that will initiate a 
revolution in military affairs (RMA). Allen and Husain (2017a) concurred that AI could 
spur an RMA where the speed of future conflicts will dramatically increase. An increased 
use of AI has the potential to accelerate combat decision-making processes beyond current 
process timelines that are encumbered by human cognition limitations (Allen & Husain, 
2017a). Humans will be unable to process information into action fast enough to defeat AI 
opponents (Allen & Husain, 2017b; Singer, 2009). As a result, there is a growing interest 
to decouple human operators from weapon systems, so that the weapon systems can 
prosecute targets more rapidly.  
The DoD is preparing for the possibility of employing weapons systems that 
prosecute military targets without requiring specific consent from a human operator prior 
to engagement. In 2012, the DoD initially published DoD Directive 3000.09 “Autonomy 
in Weapon Systems” that established the DoD’s policy to address designing and using 
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, and delivered a promised update to 
the directive in 2017. The directive’s overarching purpose is to minimize the probability 
that an autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon system applies force in an undesirable 
manner. The directive requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous systems must pass 
a verification and validation test to ensure that the systems function as anticipated during 
operation and to minimize the risk of unintended engagements or loss of control 
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2017a). The directive underscores the importance of 
designing human-machine interfaces so that human operators can easily understand and 
control the weapon system. Another key aspect of the directive is that it defines 
autonomous, semi-autonomous, and human supervised weapons systems, as well as the 
respective type of force that each may apply and the target types against which each may 
employ force (DoD, 2017a). 
The Marine Corps also is considering a dramatic shift in its strategy to fight future 
conflict with autonomous systems. In 2016, the Marine Corps published the Marine Corps 
Operating Concept (MOC) to express how it envisions operating and fighting future 
conflict to provide guidance for capability and tactical development. The document 
identified five critical tasks central to developing a force capable of fighting and winning 
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in a future conflict. Using unmanned systems for extending sensor and weapons capability 
and force protection is thematic throughout the document. The document also identifies the 
requirement to leverage AI and manned-unmanned teaming (United States Marine Corps, 
2016). Absent from the document is the need to leverage these systems for the purposes of 
cognitive load sharing, accelerating information processing, and decision making central 
to the 3OS. 
The UTACC program aligns with how the Marine Corps envisions future combat. 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s (MCWL) Marine Corps Security Environment 
Forecast (MCSEF) Futures 2030–2045 conducted a forecast and assessment about the 
challenges and opportunities the Marine Corps and the United States face operating in the 
global domain during 2030 to 2045. The MCSEF postulated that advances in robotics and 
autonomous systems will change the human’s role in combat (Marine Corps Warfighting 
Lab, 2015). The MCSEF suggested that machines are more cost-effective than humans in 
combat and when faced with budget constraints. The MCSEF argued that the prospect of 
saving money and lives will compel governments to replace humans with machines on the 
battlefield. The MCSEF was silent on how MCWL envisioned integrating autonomous 
systems with humans, however. By its Human 3.0 portion of the MCSEF, MCWL signaled 
that it believed humans will remain on the battlefield concurrently with autonomous 
systems (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2015). Additionally, the MCSEF grouped 
robotics and autonomous systems together. Robotics and autonomous systems are not 
necessarily synonymous and present distinct problem sets, however.  
E. AUTONOMY AND AUTOMATION 
Autonomy and automation are two terms currently en vogue, but the meanings of 
these terms are not standard across industry and the military. Additionally, a heated debate 
is ongoing among researchers, industry, and the military on how to correctly apply these 
terms and their meaning to the operational context of unmanned systems.  
The terms autonomy and automation mean different things to different people. 
Early AI pioneer and MIT Professor Marvin Minsky (2006) coined the term “suitcase 
words” to describe words that carry meaning regarding a vast range of loosely related 
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emotions, ideas or concepts. Terms such as Autonomy, Automation, AI and Unmanned 
Systems are suitcase words that encompass a vast range of approaches to calculation, 
decision-making, problem-solving and task actions. It is necessary to ‘unpack’ these 
suitcase words to find the consensus and conflict in the definitions and concepts around 
this continuously evolving community of practice. 
Some researchers posited that autonomy and automation exist on a scale from no 
autonomy to complete autonomy. Taxonomies and ontologies of autonomy and automation 
inherit heavily from the early work of Sheridan and Verplank (1978). As part of their 
research on human teleoperation of remotely operated undersea systems, Sheridan and 
Verplank (1978) produced a taxonomy that was the seminal work underpinning later 
elaborations. Their Levels of Automation of Decision and Action Selection (see Appendix 
B, Table 4) defined a 10-step scale of automation for human-and-computer controlled 
systems. They characterized the lowest level of automation as a situation where a human 
makes all the decisions and the machine makes none. They characterized the highest level 
of automation where the computer makes every decision with no input or direction from 
the human. This early work was designed for the narrow domain of undersea teleoperation 
of robotic systems and was limited in the context of the available technology at the time. 
The important contribution was the presentation of a taxonomy that proposed a range of 
options for shared or collaborative tasks.  
Endsley and Kaber (1999) adapted and refined the 10-step scale from Sheridan and 
Verplank, building a more generalizable framework intended to accommodate cognitive 
and psychomotor tasks in a multi-goal, multi-task environment. The scale is similar to the 
earlier work in defining the lowest automation as pure human manual and executive control 
contrasted with the highest automation as robots operating without the need or possibility 
of human assistance or intervention (see Appendix B, Table 5). Endsley and Kaber also 
added four functional dimensions to their 10-step scale to accommodate descriptions of 
systems that vary in capability or authority through a cycle of execution. The four functions 
include monitoring the environment, generating alternatives for goals and actions, selecting 
among those alternatives, and implementing the selected action. The significant addition 
of the four functional dimensions allows a more nuanced understanding of automation and 
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autonomy, where a decision system may have great leeway in generating solutions for a 
given problem—the decision to act may entirely depend on human consent, or, conversely, 
a human may be required to develop a course of action and decide to act, but the 
implementation may require the speed and precision of completely automated control 
systems. 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) produced a similar progression to 
Endsley and Kaber’s expansion of Sheridan and Verplank’s initial work. Parasuraman et al. 
(2000) retained the ten step automation scale and refined previously ambiguous language 
defining some of the scale steps (see Appendix B, Table 6). Notably, the researchers added 
a four-stage process to separate automation across functions of information processing. 
Parasuraman’s group separate functional autonomy into information acquisition, 
information analysis, decision selection, and action implementation, closely mirroring 
Endsley and Kaber’s (1999) functional domains of monitoring environment, generating 
alternatives, selecting alternatives, and implementing actions. 
Save and Feuerberg (2012) drew heavily on the work on Endsley and Kaber (1999) 
and Parasuraman et al. (2000). They combined other work on distributed cognition with 
their own analysis to propose their new Level of Automation Taxonomy (LOAT). The 
LOAT framework spreads 5–8 levels of automation across the four functional processing 
steps of information processing. A standout difference in their scale is the progression from 
‘Support of Action’ to ‘Automation of Action’ on the autonomy axis. This distinction 
underpins Save and Feuerberg’s perspective of addressing automation relative to human 
performance. Defining automation strictly relative to human performance makes this 
framework useful in analyzing human-machine teaming, but risks rendering the tool less 
useful in applications where no human is present.  
The LOAT framework seems broadly generalizable to team-based cognitive and 
psychomotor tasks. The consensus findings of the preceding research classify automation 
in levels from low automation with pure human manual control, up to high automation 
where computers operate without intervention. The consensus of research also 
acknowledges that the level of automation only applies to specific tasks or responsibilities 
in the processing and action cycle. 
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Beer, Fisk, and Rogers (2014) built on the previous literature by defining autonomy 
for technology as the ability to sense, plan and act to achieve a goal, without external 
control. With a focus on autonomy for robotics, Beer et al. digested the 10-step scale of the 
prior literature to build a framework that precedes the categorization of autonomy with 
questions identifying the task and a robot’s task allocation and capacity to perform the task 
(see Appendix B, Figure 20).  
Beer et al.’s work also considered variables from the human and robot elements 
that affect the Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). Beer et al. discussed the distinction 
between Intervention and Interaction as the ‘I’ in HRI, where Intervention is a specific 
interaction that requires a human input, while Interaction accommodates communication 
with humans, but does not require it. Beer et al. acknowledged two viewpoints in the 
literature on HRI. One viewpoint is that high autonomy requires less HRI, dependent on 
the machine’s capability to perceive, decide, and act within a dynamically changing 
environment without human input. The other viewpoint is that high autonomy requires high 
HRI because high-autonomy robots will collaborate and work with humans. While not 
explicit in Beer et al.’s research, the distinction between intervention and interaction 
appears to help resolve the tension in the two schools of thought. The “Intervention” school 
assumes an operational environment where exposure to humans can be minimal or 
completely absent, while the “Interaction” school asserts that high-functioning autonomous 
robots will work with and around humans.  
Bradshaw et al. (2004) also proposed the concept of a framework that centers on 
the interaction of teams of humans and autonomy. Johnson et al. (2011) built on Bradshaw 
et al.’s concepts, and presented a viewpoint contrary to the previously dominant theories 
around “levels” of autonomy. The researchers asserted that the complexity and dynamic 
conditions of military missions defy the clean-cut allocation of exactly assigned tasks and 
functions, and cited the Defense Science Board’s (DSB) report on the Role of Autonomy 
in DoD Systems (2012). The Defense Science Board (2012) also dismissed “levels” of 
autonomy as not useful in the DoD’s understanding of autonomy. Where the inheritors of 
Sheridan and Verplank were building on a model born in the isolated, remote, undersea 
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task environment, the DSB, Bradshaw, and Johnson present a strong case for the 
inadequacy of “Levels of Automation” for the range of military operations. 
Drawing on the work of Thompson (1967) to describe Interdependence in 
Organizational Design and assuming an operational vision of human and robots 
collaborating in a shared environment, Johnson et al. (2011) stated that interdependence 
can manifest as task, capability, team structure and environment. Johnson et al. also made 
a critical experimental observation that independent autonomous systems have undesirable 
results as the high-independence autonomous systems are increasingly opaque to human 
supervisors. Additionally, Johnson et al. provided a useful ontological tool for 
distinguishing self-directedness and self-sufficiency when describing autonomous systems 
(see Figure 1). Self-sufficiency is the autonomous agent’s ability to tend to its own needs. 
Self-directedness is the autonomous agent’s freedom from outside control. The researchers 
found that the important distinction and independence of these two axes further invalidate 
a one-dimensional scale of Levels of Autonomy. 
 
Figure 1.  Autonomy Dimensions of Self-Directedness versus Self-Sufficiency. 
Source: Bradshaw et al. (2013). 
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Autonomy, automation, AI, and unmanned systems are not the same thing. The 
terms are frequently used interchangeably but are also used as distinct discriminators in the 
literature (Elliott & Stewart, 2012). Moray et al. (2000) defined automation as “any 
sensing, detection, information-processing, decision-making, or control action that could 
be performed by humans but is actually performed by a machine” (p. 44). Woods (1996) 
stated that automated systems are deterministic. 
Thrun’s work in autonomous robotics yielded the insight that Autonomy refers to 
“a robot’s ability to accommodate variations in its environment” (2004, p. 14). Accepting 
the level of determinism as the discriminator between automation and autonomy provides 
a useful ontological understanding of the terms to add clarity to later discussion of 
applications of Autonomous technology. Automation is necessary for, but not equal to, 
Autonomy.  
1. Industrial Definitions of Autonomy and Automation 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a non-regulatory agency 
within the Department of Commerce whose charter includes advancing U.S. industry 
through the development and use of industrial standards. NIST developed its Framework 
in an attempt to provide the emerging U.S. unmanned systems industry and consumers with 
a common language to describe unmanned systems. The NIST Framework subscribes to 
“Levels of Autonomy” school of thought, consistent with an approach to Unmanned 
Systems where the apotheosis of autonomy is independent of any human interaction 
(Huang, 2008). The Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework 
comprises a Terminology Volume (Huang, 2008) and a Framework Volume (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) and was developed in conjunction with various DoD 
and industry interests. The Terminology Volume contains a useful set of multi-domain 
definitions that add to the body of knowledge and should be considered in the discussion 
of autonomy taxonomy. 
The U.S. Department of Transport (DoT), through its National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), adopted a six-step taxonomy of “Levels of Automation” 
(see Appendix B, Table 7) from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International 
 16 
standard J3016TM codified in the 2016 Federal Automated Vehicle Policy (National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2016). SAE, a professional body for the 
automotive and aerospace engineering industry developed the J3016 standard in an attempt 
to forge an international consensus in industry for the terminology of autonomous driving 
systems (Society of Automotive Engineers, 2014). The J3016 standard is relevant to this 
literature as autonomous driving systems are a subset of the larger body of autonomous 
systems of interest to the military and the accepted terminology in the automotive industry 
will likely bleed over into discussions around autonomous systems writ large. J3016 TM 
comes from the high-autonomy-as-low-HMI school of thought, reflecting the industry goal 
to provide consumers with a completely driverless experience. 
2. DoD Definitions of Autonomy and Automation 
The DoD has been slow to formalize definitions of Autonomy and Automation, 
despite having the appropriate publication (the DoD Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, the DoD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) to formally declare a common DoD 
definition at the highest, most authoritative level in Joint Service Reference Publication. 
JP1-02’s current definition of autonomous operation (see Appendix A) is specific to a 
contingency operation mode of air defense and as such considers such an extremely narrow 
subset of technical applicability that it brings no clarity to the discussion, except perhaps 
to illustrate the still-nascent nature of the DoD’s understanding of autonomy (DoD, 2017c). 
DoD Directive 3000.09 does provide the DoD’s high-level definition of 
autonomous, semi-autonomous and human supervised weapons systems (see Appendix A), 
wherein autonomous weapons have some latitude in selection and engagement of targets, 
while semi-autonomous systems do “not autonomously select and engage individual targets 
or specific target groups that have not been previously selected by an authorized human 
operator” (DoD, 2017a, p. 16). These definitions are helpful and indicate that the DoD is 
bent towards autonomy as a function of self-directedness, but the definition is restricted to 
targeting and weapons release authority and does not generalize to broader decision-
making and non-weapons functions. 
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The Defense Science Board is a body within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
chartered to give “advice and recommendations on science, technology, manufacturing, 
acquisition process, and other matters” (Defense Science Board, 2016a, p. 1) to senior 
Defense leaders. In their initial report on the Role of Autonomy in Weapons Systems 
(Defense Science Board, 2012) and subsequent Summer Study on Autonomy (Defense 
Science Board, 2016b), the DSB provided the authoritative definitions for the DoD’s 
concept of Autonomy. The DSB (2012) defined autonomy as, “a capability (or set of 
capabilities) that enable a particular action of a system to be automatic or, within 
programmed boundaries, ‘self-governing’” (p. 11). The DSB (2016) distinguished between 
automation as the ability to follow prescriptive rules with no deviation allowed or 
programmed, whereas autonomous systems have the ability to identify more than one 
possible action choice and pick a choice all within its constraints to accomplish a goal. This 
distinction is consistent with Thrun’s (2004) and Woods’ (1996) academic work. 
The DSB’s (2012) limited weapons system focus is significantly expanded in the Board’s 
2016 report, in that it defined autonomy in the High-Autonomy as High Interaction school 
of thought consistent with Bradshaw and Johnson’s views of coactive design. The DSB 
summer study grounded the definition of autonomy in the future environment of 
accelerating information volume and velocity. The study established the importance of 
harnessing autonomy beyond the realm of robotics to include autonomous agents existing 
solely in information technology systems and software. These are essential areas for 
consideration in the future Defense domain as assets and team-mates to the human 
warfighters. 
The DoD’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap referred to the need for 
Manned-Unmanned Teams (MUM-T) composed of humans and unmanned robotic 
systems. In its Roadmap, the DoD focused on the value of unmanned systems in the dull, 
dirty, and dangerous environments demonstrating an approach grounded in the idea of 
robots working in environments while human teammates monitor from a safe distance 
(DoD, 2013). Johnson et al. (2014) stated that a fully realized HMT concept must also 
consider humans and autonomous systems collaborating closely in the same space on 
common goals. Bradshaw et al. (2012) also noted the shortcomings of approaches that fail 
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to consider integrated goals and environments for Human-Agent-Robot-Teams. The 
remainder of this paper accepts the capacity for continuing, complex interaction with the 
environment and human operators as the ideal and working definition of autonomy due to 
its utility in the military context.  
F. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE / MACHINE COGNITION 
Another important aspect of this thesis is a well-developed understanding of the 
taxonomy of AI and machine cognition. AI and machine cognition are not a one-size-fits-
all application, in that there are many different varieties that are designed for specific 
applications. 
The scientific field of AI seeks to understand and construct intelligent entities 
(Russell, Norvig, Canny, Malik, & Edwards, 2010). AI is a critical component of advanced 
autonomous and unmanned systems that are of great interest to the DoD (DoD, 2013; 
DoD, 2017a; DoD, 2017b; Defense Science Board, 2012), but AI and autonomy are not 
interchangeable terms. 
The term AI encompasses a wide range of theories and technology across a broad 
spectrum of capability and maturity. Brunette et al.’s broad survey of the AI field noted 
that “the field is extraordinarily difficult to encapsulate either chronologically or 
thematically” (Brunette, Flemmer, & Flemmer, 2009, p. 385). AI is not a “term of art” that 
encapsulates an agreed-upon set of technologies in this area of research. Expert systems, 
Rule-based systems, Machine Cognition, Machine Intelligence, Autonomous systems and 
many other titles describe subsets under the AI umbrella that offer social, commercial or 
military utility. Robert Button, a RAND Corporation researcher, attributes the ambiguity 
to the constant evolution of the field (Button, 2013). Booz Allen Hamilton’s industry 
whitepaper on Machine Intelligence notes the contribution to the confusion from marketing 
hype and fantastical media depictions (Dulny et al., 2017). It is necessary to define and 
explain concepts to eliminate ambiguity in the conversation regarding the DoDs intent and 
goals in integrating AI.  
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1. AI History 
The early theoretical work of John Von Neumann and Alan Turing seeded the field 
of AI in the modern era in the 1940s and 1950s. Many early contributors to AI research 
gathered for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project in 1956. The discussions there 
proposed many of the ideas and possibilities for research, and many of the attendees went 
on to establish the academic centers of AI research that abide today at places like MIT, 
Stanford and Carnegie Mellon University (McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 
2006; Brunette, Flemmer, & Flemmer, 2009).  
The earliest AI programs demonstrated in 1956 were capable of solving 
mathematical logic problems, and the field has produced increasingly complex milestones 
since then. AI victories over humans in Backgammon in 1979 (Tesauro, 1995) were 
followed with the defeat of the world champion Chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov in 1996 
(Krauthammer, 1996) and, more recently, the victory of an AI system over Lee Sedol, the 
world champion in the sport of “Go” in 2017. This sequence of victories demonstrated 
increased sophistication through developing new approaches to tackle games with 
increasing combinatorial complexity. AI systems demonstrated the ability to drive a car on 
a Paris highway under controlled conditions in fair weather in 1994. By 2005, multiple 
research teams successfully completed the 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge consisting of a 
driverless automobile negotiating the 132-mile open road course (Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, 2006).  
Various sources credit the recent cycle of renewed AI research and success to the 
convergence of key supporting technologies, specifically the reduced cost of powerful 
computer processors and the increased volume and accessibility of large data sets 
(Dulny et al., 2017; Chandler & Sweller, 1996; Russell et al., 2010). The continued trend 
of improving computer processors, and the aggregation of massive volumes of data enabled 
by modern IT systems, provide the tools that allow today’s researchers to move closer to 
the vision presented at Dartmouth in 1956.  
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2. Branch Definitions of AI  
To employ AI correctly, one must understand the various AI subtypes. AI is 
comprised of two sub-types that have distinct capabilities and purposes. The term “Strong” 
and “Weak” AI were coined by Searle (1980) to describe two fundamentally different 
threads of AI development. Strong and Weak do not imply an objective superiority of 
Strong over Weak systems, but rather a division between systems that focus on narrow 
objective functions and those that attempt to fully replicate a human level of cognition and 
intelligence. Searle favored the “Weak AI” approach that viewed AI as a powerful but 
limited tool that could mimic the outcomes of some human intelligence tasks, but lacked 
any intrinsic sense of meaning or purpose. Searle deemed “Strong AI” systems that sought 
to completely replicate the intentionality of a human mind as infeasible. Ray Kurzweil’s 
definition of Strong AI is an AI that exceeds human intelligence, omitting Searle’s 
condition of intentionality, and he determined the Strong AI as feasible and likely. 
(Kurzweil, 2005). This definition is consistent with methods that seek an Artificial General 
Intelligence, a “universal algorithm for learning and acting in any environment” as defined 
by Russell et al. (2010, p. 27). 
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) classifies this as a division 
between narrow (weak) AI and general (strong) AI (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2016) where their definition of general AI aligns with Kurzweil’s (2005), 
describing general AI as that which can generalize its functions to all areas of human 
intelligence, and perform at a higher level than a human could. Potember also defined AI 
research as an attempt to build “general cognitive abilities” and “perform any task that a 
human might do” (Chandler & Sweller, 1996, p7). Brunette et al.’s definition presents AGI 
as a non-embodied intelligent agent resulting from lack of success in integrating AI with 
robotics (Brunette, Flemmer, & Flemmer, 2009). This definition is not consistent with the 
consensus in the field and incorrectly implies that non-embodied AI is qualitatively less 
technically ambitious than embodied AI. 
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3. Expert Systems 
The term Weak AI includes Expert Systems and Machine Learning methods that 
do not generalize to larger problem sets than those to which they are applied. Expert 
Systems excel in deterministic automatic rule sets that can be described as if-then rules. 
Expert Systems are the product of a logic-based approach to capturing declarative 
and descriptive knowledge to deliver a competent problem-solving capability and have a 
capacity to update the knowledge (Buchanan, Davis, & Feigenbaum, 2006). Dulny et al. 
(2017) asserted that Expert Systems are labor intensive to build beyond limited functions 
as the entire rule set must be derived and formalized, and must be deliberately 
reprogrammed if the expert rule set needs to be updated. This narrow context of the 
captured domain and inability to generalize to broader problems is inherent in this approach 
and leads to the categorization of expert systems and knowledge-based systems as weak 
methods (Russell et al., 2010).  
It is erroneous to suggest that the Expert System classification replicates the full 
range and depth of all the faculties of a human domain expert. Cognitive Science and AI 
Theorist Schank noted, “The term ‘expert system’ is loaded with a great deal more implied 
intelligence than is warranted by their actual level of sophistication” (Schank & Childers, 
1984, p. 33).  
The medical field employed some of the earliest Expert Systems. To wit, the early 
demonstrators of the technology DENDRAL exemplified Expert Systems. The researchers 
developed a large set of formal rules based on an empirical model of the spectral emissions 
of molecules to create a program capable of identifying the composition of a molecule 
based on the energy detected in a mass spectrometer (Russell et al., 2010). MYCIN took a 
derived-data approach where researchers developed rules for the Expert System through 
extensive interviews with domain experts to develop a system that could competently 
perform decision-based subtasks in the medical treatment of blood infections (Buchanan 
& Shortliffe, 1984). Some modern examples of Expert Systems include high-frequency 
financial trading systems or electronic autopilot control systems that monitor data streams 
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and react with a level of precision, speed, and persistence that far exceeds the capacity that 
even a team of human operators could achieve for those specific tasks (Dulny et al., 2017). 
Machine Learning (ML) Systems comprise the types of AI that use training or 
feedback to change the performance of the software over time. Buchanan (2005) proposed 
that learning is what differentiates intelligent systems from purely automatic systems, with 
automatic as a discriminator of intelligence and raw automation. Button (2017) coined the 
term “frozen software” to describe software that cannot fundamentally adjust its decisions 
and rules based on feedback, in contrast to the ability of ML systems to change their input-
output product based on new information. 
ML techniques include three feedback-based learning techniques: Supervised, 
Unsupervised and Reinforcement Learning. Russell et al. (2010) give the following 
description of the differences in these three ML techniques. In Supervised Learning, the 
AI is trained using tagged training data that teaches the AI what the desired input to output 
correlation looks like. This results in AI that can effectively perform regression and 
classification tasks, such as computer vision object recognition and the steering algorithms 
in self-driving cars. Unsupervised Learning is a process where the AI is given no explicit 
training but perceives “clusters” in the target dataset. This technique is used in applications 
such as consumer trend analysis and traffic pattern analysis where the goal is to identify 
underlying patterns and anomalies that emerge from the data. Semi-Supervised Learning 
is a hybrid of Supervised and Unsupervised Learning, using only a small tagged training 
data set to seed the analytic performance on a larger set of untagged data. This method 
balances the verifiability of supervised learning with the versatility of Unsupervised 
Learning and the value of being able to use Unsupervised Learning’s large untagged data 
sets. Reinforcement Learning is a feedback technique where an AI is “scored” on a task 
performance such as a chess game, and iteratively modifies its performance over time to 
achieve higher performance by exploring new methods and exploiting successful methods. 
Reinforcement Learning has applicability in fields as diverse as industrial control systems, 
education management (Sottilare, Brawner, Goldberg, & Holden, 2012) and medical 
treatment strategies (Nemati, Ghassemi, & Clifford, 2016). 
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a. The Five Tribes of Machine Learning 
Researcher Pedro Domingos (2015) presented the concept of five “tribes” of 
Machine Learning. Domingos’ tribes tie each ML approach to their scientific 
epistemology. Symbolists, Connectionists, Evolutionaries, Bayesians, and Analogizers 
represent approaches derived from symbolic logic, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, 
statistics, and psychology, respectively. 
The Symbolic approach, grounded in logic-based systems pioneered by Newell and 
Simon, is the basis of the Expert Systems that underpin a great deal of AI applications in 
use today (Russell et al., 2010).  
The Connectionist approach seeks to achieve AI by reverse-engineering the 
architecture of the human brain. Early work on modeling human neurons by Hebbes’ 
Perceptron and Rosenblatt’s FeedForward Network showed promise but research on 
Neural Networks lay somewhat dormant through the ‘60s and ‘70s, until a renewed interest 
set the stage for breakthroughs since 1999 (Dulny et al., 2017). Researchers using layers 
of neural networks called Deep Neural Networks (DNN) and Deep Convolutional 
Networks (DCNs) also known as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are behind the 
leaps of progress in self-driving vehicles, image classification, and machine victories over 
human champions in cognitive games (Dulny et al., 2017; Chandler & Sweller, 1996).  
The Evolutionary approach, inspired by biological evolutionary systems beginning 
with Friedberg 1958, was the precursor to the modern work in Genetic Algorithms. This 
method generates algorithms that create solutions to an objective function, then select the 
characteristics of the highest performing solutions and cross-breed those characteristics 
with characteristics of other high-performing solutions to create the next iterations of the 
algorithm. 
The Bayesian approach uses statistical methods such as probabilistic inference to 
reduce uncertainty around the parameters and variables in a dataset. 
The Analogizer approach began in the study of human psychology and learning, 
and seeks to model the observed processes without necessarily emulating the physical 
architecture the way the Connectionists did. 
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The DoD’s current and planned applications of AI include Computer Vision, 
Natural Language Processing, Robotics and Control systems, and Decision Support 
through data analysis, search and planning, systems. Domingos’ work highlighted that no 
single “tribal” approach can satisfy the diverse expectations on AI. In the absence of an 
integrated AI, humans will remain to be the connector and interpreter of results from the 
various AI systems. 
Decision Support tasks could include automatic and analytic processes that give 
solutions such as optimization, schedules and plans, forecasts, systems control and 
feedback, and more. In decision support with knowledge-based systems such as Expert 
systems and knowledge-based ML, the AI is searching for optimal answers, constrained by 
the amount and quality of available knowledge, consistent with Simon’s theory of Bounded 
Rationality (Simon, 1972). 
Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb (2017) stated recent advances in AI are best thought 
of as a drop in the cost of prediction. AI is knowledge and search, and decision making is 
judgment. Cheaper, more accurate prediction means less judgment (expertise) is required. 
Computer Vision includes techniques for processing still and video imagery for 
purposes such as object recognition in still images, event detection in videos, optical 
character recognition for text processing, image enhancement, image manipulation and 
scene modeling. 
Natural Language processing research has recently achieved performance and 
accuracy, allowing it to penetrate the consumer market, fueled by investment supporting 
consumer-grade digital assistants by companies such as Google (Google Assistant), 
Microsoft (Cortana), Apple (Siri) and Amazon (Alexa). Natural Language Processing 
solves the problem of encoding human speech into a symbolic, machine-readable form, but 
does not guarantee the machine has an understanding of the data as contextual information 
or knowledge. Natural Language Processing does not solve the communication problem of 
shared situation awareness beyond layer 8 of Monfelt, Pilemalm, Hallberg, and Yngström’s 
14-layer extended open systems interconnection model (Delgado, 2015). The data is 
exchanged but the human component of semiotics requires formal definitions be reinforced 
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through training and experience to achieve a predictable level of performance in effective 
communication. 
4. Intelligent Agents 
A combination of AI algorithms with or without sensors and actuators can deliver 
intelligent agents. While AI algorithms can be applied as an application that crunches 
numbers and delivers processed data, the intelligent agent is a system that has some ability 
to act and interact (Russell et al., 2010). An intelligent agent may be an embodied 
intelligent agent in a robotic form or a purely virtual system that acts by communicating 
with other systems or human team-mates. Rasskin-Gutman (2009) noted that intelligent 
agents and multi-agent teams were the product of combinations of algorithms capable of 
performing processes regardless of a physical embodiment. The DoD has expressed 
interest in intelligent agents that can sense, decide, and act in ways that increase lethality, 
advantage, effectiveness, and efficiency (Chandler & Sweller, 1996). 
AI is already proving its value in limited-scope tasks associated with task 
automation and pattern recognition, and can be expected to improve its performance over 
time. AI is still very far from achieving an end-state of an Artificial General Intelligence 
capable of human-level intellect, as proposed by the Dartmouth group. Chapter IV 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches to AI. 
G. HUMAN COGNITION 
In the previous section of this chapter, the authors reviewed the AI’s history and 
taxonomy, and intelligent agents. In this section, the authors will review the relevant 
research on human cognition as it relates to processing information about the environment 
to develop and maintain situation awareness, a state that the authors will also discuss. 
Cognition is an interdisciplinary term, the meaning of which differs depending on 
the perspective of the respective field. The Oxford English Dictionary (“Cognition,” n.d.) 
defined cognition as, “the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and 
understanding through thought, experience, and the senses.” Sell, Rothenberg and 
Chapman (2013) defined cognition from a medical perspective as the “mental faculty of 
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knowing, including perceiving, thinking, recognizing, and remembering” (p. 128). 
Applying a psychology lens, the Cambridge Dictionary of Psychology (Matsumoto, 2009) 
defined cognition as “a general term for all forms of mental processes including conscious 
ones such as perception, thought, and memory, as well as unconscious processes such as 
grammatical construction, parsing of sensory data into precepts, and the neural control of 
physiological processes” (p. 114). For the purposes of this thesis, cognition is the complex 
mental ability that makes communication, decision-making, reasoning, problem-solving, 
and other complex mental processes possible.  
1. Learning 
Learning is a key cognitive process to human thought, decision-making, and 
understanding. Learning is the process of acquiring new knowledge from the environment 
by synthesizing newly acquired information with prior knowledge in working memory, 
resulting in updated existing schemata or developing new schemata that are written to long-
term memory (Clark, 2008). Sweller, Ayres, and Kalyuga (2011) stated that understanding 
occurs when an individual can process all of the interacting information elements in 
working memory. Therefore, to understand how a human learns, it is important to review 
relevant research on memory frameworks and memory types to appreciate their impact on 
learning and understanding.  
2. Memory 
There are three types of memories that the human mind uses to capture information 
and store it in a manner such that the person can recall the knowledge when needed. 
Procedural memories consist of knowledge about how to perform a mental task, such as 
solving a math problem, or physical task, such as riding a bike—the proverbial “muscle 
memory” (Sprenger, 1999; Tulving, 1985). Semantic memories, or contextual/spatial 
memory, contain information about facts or details about an object that the human has not 
personally experienced (Sprenger, 1999; Tulving, 1985). This type of memory allows 
humans to create mental models and apply meaning to symbols. Episodic memories contain 
information that allows a person to recall personally experienced events (Sprenger, 1999; 
Tulving, 1985).  
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a. Working Memory 
Human working memory is somewhat analogous to computer memory in that it is 
where information lives in an activated state. Working memory is “the primary structure 
that processes incoming information from the environment” and it “obtains information 
from long-term memory in order to provide an organized link to the environment” (Sweller 
et al., 2011, p. 42, p. 49). Sweller et al. (2011) argued that information activated in working 
memory is the only information that a person is aware of at a given time. This is analogous 
to the requirement for a computer to place information into volatile memory in order to 
read or manipulate the information. Both common discourse and research often use the 
terms Working Memory (WM) and Short-Term Memory (STM) interchangeably. Some 
research does not distinguish between WM and STM, or argues that the two definitions are 
so similar that they can be used interchangeably (Anderson, 1990). Cowan (1995) provided 
a more explicit description of STM as a storage subcomponent of WM for activated 
information elements, and that WM is comprised of STM and the central executive that 
controls the attention function. Baddeley (2010) agreed with Cowan that WM is comprised 
of a central executive and STM, but argued that STM has two parts: the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad that stores visually perceived memories and the phonological loop that stores 
aurally perceived memories. Additionally, Baddeley (2010) contended that WM contains 
the episodic buffer that combines related visual and audio stimulus. 
Unlike computer memory, which is only limited by the number of memory slots on 
a motherboard and the capacity of each piece of memory, human working memory is 
limited and not expandable. For this reason, humans do not possess unlimited cognitive 
capacity (Sweller, 1988). Miller’s seminal research found that humans can only store 
approximately seven pieces of information in working memory at a time, which drastically 
constrains human information processing capability (Miller, 1956). Additionally, 
information elements remain in working memory for only a short duration, measured in 
seconds (Baddeley, 2010). Information stored in short-term memory decays and is lost 
unless rehearsed (Baddeley, 2010). Rehearsal requires attention thereby reducing 
attentional capacity available for other tasks. 
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Humans are able to overcome working memory limitations to a certain degree. 
While Miller (1956) concluded that humans can only store a small and finite number of 
information items in working memory, the size of each piece of information may vary 
depending on how the information is chunked. Feltovich, Prietula, and Ericsson (2006) 
defined a chunk as “a perceptual or memory structure that bonds a number of more 
elementary units into a larger organization” (p. 49). This ability allows the human to place 
more information in working memory without exceeding Miller’s limitation on the number 
of information elements that can be stored therein. For instance, humans can typically store 
significantly more letters in working memory if they chunk those letters together into words 
rather than storing them as individual characters. The ability to chunk information elements 
into larger integrated chunks of information is one key to developing expertise (Feltovich, 
Prietula & Erricsson, 2006). With experience gained through practice and repetition, 
information chunks grow to include more information elements. 
b. Long-Term Memory 
Long-term memory (LTM) is the component of the human cognitive architecture 
that is responsible for storing memories when they are not activated in working memory 
(Sweller et al., 2011). In this way, LTM is the cognitive structure analogous to a computer 
hard disk drive. LTM stores both declarative memories, such as episodic and semantic 
memories, as well as non-declarative memories, such as procedural memories (Tulving, 
1985). Sweller, Van Merriënboer, and Paas (1998) argued that humans are not aware of 
memories in long-term storage until they are activated in the short-term memory store for 
processing. Sweller (2008) contended that LTM stores all the knowledge acquired during 
learning. According to schema theory, LTM houses the person’s knowledge and memories 
as schemas, which are cognitive structures that combine multiple information elements into 
one element according to how the person uses the information (Sweller, et al., 1998; 
Sweller et al., 2011; Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003). Lampinen and Beike 
(2014) proposed that schemas influence how we perceive and understand the world. A 
mental model is a type of schema that captures a person’s knowledge of how an abstract 
system functions (Endsley, 1995). Schema activation and use require varying degrees of 
effort. Newly acquired schemas require considerable more effort to activate than schemas 
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that have been practiced (Sweller et al., 2011). Learning to read or solving basic addition 
problems are anecdotal evidence of this assertion, as they require effort. 
3. Perception 
Humans must sense data about the environment via sensors to understand the 
environmental state. Perception is the cognitive process of encoding environmental stimuli 
received from sensors into signals that the mind can process (Treisman, 1969). Endsley 
(1995) defined perception as the lowest level of situation awareness, which this chapter 
later discusses in further detail. 
4. Attention 
Humans are unable to process all of the stimuli that constantly barrage the human 
sensory system, in part due to their limited attention capacity. While most research agreed 
that a relationship between perception and attention exists, there remains a lack of 
agreement on the nature of the relationship. Broadbent (1958) described the selective 
aspect of attention as a filter that restricts the information that is processed so that it can 
pass through a limited capacity channel to working memory. Treisman (1969) defined 
attention as the selective aspect of perception and response. Endsley (1995) viewed 
attention as a requirement for information processing, in that an individual requires it to 
perceive and process environmental stimuli, make decisions, and execute actions. While a 
significant portion of research analyzed attention as it relates to orienting on external 
stimuli, Posner (1980) argued that attention can also orient internally on schemas in 
memory. Kahneman (1973) claimed that attentional capacity varies based on an 
individual’s level of arousal.  
5. Arousal 
An individual’s level of arousal may affect the individual’s cognitive processes and 
performance by extension. Pfaff (2006) defined generalized arousal as the level of 
responsiveness to sensory stimuli, level of motor activity, and level of affect. Researchers 
believe that arousal affects an individual’s attention selectivity by focusing attention on 
and encoding the arousing stimulus (Easterbrook, 1959). Sharot and Phelps (2004) 
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concluded that humans remember arousing stimuli longer than non-arousing stimuli. While 
increased arousal may result in improved cognitive performance, it is bounded. 
Kahneman (1973) summarized work performed by Yerkes and Dodson in 1908 that 
suggested the relationship between arousal and performance is u-shaped, but they also 
found that the optimum level of arousal needed when performing a complex task is lower 
than for a simpler task. This relationship might be a result of the cognitive load that a 
complex task places on the individual’s cognitive system. 
H. COGNITIVE LOAD THEORY 
To prevent the use of machine teammates from degrading human performance, one 
must understand human cognitive load, what factors contribute to cognitive load, and how 
to measure it. Cognitive load theory’s central tenet is that a human’s learning ability is 
negatively impacted when the total information processing requirements exceed the 
capacity of the human’s limited working memory capacity (Sweller, 1988). Sweller et al. 
(1998) defined cognitive load as “the load that performing a particular task imposes on the 
cognitive system” (p. 266). There are two aspects of cognitive load: mental load, which is 
“the load that is imposed by task (environmental) demands” and mental effort, which is 
“the amount of cognitive capacity or resources that is actually allocated to accommodate 
the task demands” (Sweller et al., 1998, p. 266). Hence, a task with a relatively higher 
mental load requires a relatively higher mental effort from the individual, resulting in an 
increased cognitive load. Sweller et al. (2011) argued that high levels of cognitive load are 
linked to increased learning time and increased error rates and, therefore, poor 
performance. 
There are three contributors to cognitive load. Intrinsic load arises from a task’s 
innate complexity. Sweller (2010) argued that a task’s intrinsic load depends on how 
complex the information is that a person must understand to perform the task. The amount 
of interactivity of a task’s information elements determines the information complexity 
and, by extension, a task’s intrinsic load (Sweller, 2010). A task with a higher degree of 
interactivity among its information elements will impart higher loads on an individual’s 
cognitive process because the individual must keep each of the elements active in working 
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memory to process the information correctly. The second contributor of cognitive load is 
the extraneous load. Sweller (2010) attributed this load to how task related information is 
formatted, organized, and presented to the individual. The last contributor of cognitive load 
is the germane load, which arises from developing new schemata that result from learning 
to perform the task (Sweller et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 2011).  
1. Cognitive Load Contributing Factors 
Identifying the factors that contribute to cognitive load is important for 
understanding how cognitive overload occurs and how to prevent it. Paas, Van 
Merriënboer, and Adam (1994) identified that a task’s characteristics, an individual’s 
cognitive characteristics, and task-individual interaction are the three broad causal factors 
of a task’s cognitive load (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Factors Affecting Cognitive Load. Source: Paas and 
Van Merriënboer (1994). 
Paas and Van Merriënboer (1994) decomposed task characteristics into the task’s structure, 
reward system, time restraint, and novelty. Task structure is a broad term that incorporates 
Sweller, Van Merriënboer, and Paas’ intrinsic and extrinsic loads previously discussed. 
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Most students who have taken an important timed test have felt the pressure of a task’s 
reward system and time restraints, and thus the contribution to cognitive load of taking the 
test. Paas and Van Merriënboer (1994) also identified that the environmental conditions, 
such as extreme temperatures and noises, can contribute to a task’s cognitive load.  
Tasks can also be categorized based on what type of behavior the task requires. 
Rasmussen (1983) categorized behaviors as skill-based, rules-based, and knowledge-
based. Skills-based tasks leverage highly automated sensory-motor actions. Rules-based 
tasks are tasks that can be accomplished by applying a well-defined rule-set. While 
uncertainty can exist in rule-based tasks, the amount of uncertainty must remain low to 
prevent the rule-set from becoming brittle (Rasmussen, 1983). Knowledge-based tasks are 
tasks that have such a high degree of uncertainty that applying a rule-set is not practical. 
Hence, these task types require the use of mental models, judgment, and intuition to 
accomplish. Cummings (2014) noted that an individual’s cognitive load will be lowest 
when completing a skill-based task and highest when completing a knowledge-based task. 
Individual-specific factors also impact cognitive load. Paas, Van Merriënboer, and 
Adam (1994) argued that an individual’s cognitive capacity and prior knowledge of the 
task may reduce the cognitive load that a task imposes on the individual. Volatile factors, 
such as a person’s motivation, arousal, and what the individual considers optimal 
performance, may also impact the cognitive load a task places on an individual (Paas et al., 
1994). Galy, Cariou, and Mélan (2012) stated that an individual’s state of arousal changes 
throughout the day, affecting the cognitive capacity available for executing tasks. An 
individual’s prior experience regarding a task also affects the mental effort. Experience is 
job- or task-specific knowledge that an individual gains over time (Quińones, Ford, & 
Teachout, 1995). An individual’s experience is important because it provides the individual 
with the relevant episodic, procedural, and semantic memories to generate the requisite 
mental models. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) proposed a five-stage continuum that 
describes how performing a task may be effortful for a novice but becomes effortless and 
automatic through experience for an expert or master (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Mental Functions of Expertise Levels. Source: 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980). 
2. Measuring Cognitive Load  
Measuring cognitive load directly is difficult because cognition occurs in the mind 
of the individual. The observer effect theory also impacts measuring, in that by attempting 
to observe an individual’s cognitive state that effort may alter the individual’s cognitive 
state. Sweller, Van Merriënboer, and Paas (1998) explained that there are three broad 
approaches to measuring cognitive load: subjective, physiological, and task/performance 
based. Subjective techniques require the individual to reflect on how much mental effort 
they felt they expended to complete a task. This method of evaluation occurs after the 
individual completes a task, or the examiner can ask the individual during task performance 
to communicate their current mental effort level. Both of these have disadvantages: 
accuracy may be affected by reflecting on a prior cognitive state, while in situ responses 
interrupt task performance and may impact the individual’s cognitive state. Physiological 
evaluation techniques rely on measuring physical changes in an individual that are 
attributed to increased mental effort or arousal state, such changes in heart rate and eye 
activity. Task/performance-based methods measure the performance of the primary task, 
or performance when an individual performs primary and secondary tasks concurrently 
(Sweller, 1988; Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). Metrics, such as response time 
to a stimulus and the correctness of the response, will vary based on the level of mental 
effort. Galy, Cariou, and Mélan (2012) synthesized prior cognitive load research into a 
framework that relates task, individual and environmental characteristics to cognitive load 
and task performance, as well as the methods for measuring cognitive load (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4.  Consolidated Cognitive Load Framework. Source: 
Galy, Cariou, and Melan (2012). 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Task Load Index 
(TLX) is one well-regarded multi-dimensional subjective evaluation that measures 
cognitive load. Developed in 1986 to assess the impact that performing a specific task has 
on a human, the test determines a subject’s relative weight of six factors—performance, 
effort, frustration, physical demand, mental demand, and temporal demand—based on how 
they contributed to overall task difficulty (NASA, n.d.). Subsequently, the subject then 
rates the magnitude of load that each factor placed on them. The benefit that the NASA 




3. Cognitive Heuristics and Biases  
Humans are naturally not adept at assigning accurate probabilities to uncertain 
outcomes. To overcome this limitation, humans rely on intuition-based heuristics so that 
they can process uncertainty with System 1 rather than with System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). 
Kahneman (2011) defined a heuristic as a “simple procedure that provides adequate but an 
imperfect answer to a difficult question” (p. 98). System 1 and System 2 are discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter. While heuristics are useful at reducing complex judgment, 
such as assigning probabilities under uncertainty, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted 
that reliance on heuristics could result in cognitive biases that lead to incorrect probability 
assignment. For example, an availability bias occurs when an individual assigns a 
probability of an event occurring or the frequency of class by how easy it is to recall 
specific instances or occurrences in the past from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
As a result, the individual assigns probabilities to future occurrences based on recall, not 
on statistical analysis, thus leading to an incorrect probability assignment.  
I. SITUATION AWARENESS  
One unique aspect of human cognition is that humans process information in the 
context of the environment. The meaning of information may change based on the 
individual’s understanding of the environmental context in which the information was 
received. Now the authors will discuss how humans gain an understanding of the 
environment, how it impacts decision-making, how errors in situation awareness occur, 
and how situation awareness occurs in a team environment. Endsley (1995) defined 
situation awareness (SA) as  
the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future. (p. 36) 
Endsley (1995) argued that SA is a significant input to, but is a distinct process 
from, decision-making. While one can gain and maintain higher levels of SA without ever 
making a decision, and one can make a decision without achieving even level 1 SA, the 
former seems unlikely in the military context and the latter is reckless. Additionally, 
Endsley’s model of SA designates SA as the input to decision making, which is the 
 36 
antecedent to performing an action (see Figure 5). Furthermore, if one was to replace 
Endsley’s SA levels in her model with Boyd’s observe and orient phases, which are 
discussed in a later portion of this chapter, the resulting framework would be remarkably 
similar to Boyd’s observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. Achieving level 2 or level 3 SA 
requires the human to achieve the prior levels of SA (Endsley, 1995). In other words, one 
cannot project an element’s future states without first perceiving the element’s attributes 
and then comprehend its meaning. Wickens (2002) concluded that gaining and maintaining 
SA is a task that requires an individual to allocate attention and working memory capacity. 
 
Figure 5.  Model of SA. Source: Endsley (1995). 
Perception is the lowest level of SA and involves sensing information about the 
status, attributes, and dynamics of elements in the environment that are relevant to the 
individual and their goals (Endsley, 1995). Perception in this sense is similar to Boyd’s 
observe stage of the OODA loop.  
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When the human applies meaning to the perceived stimuli, he or she achieves the 
second level of SA (Endsley, 1995). This requires the human to fuse the perceived stimuli 
with past experiences via schema activation in working memory. Level 2 SA is the first 
half of the orient stage of Boyd’s decision-making process. 
Endsley’s third level of SA builds on the first two levels of SA to project a near 
future state. Achieving this level of SA places a significant burden on working memory, as 
the human must not only keep their comprehension of the current environment state 
updated, but also employ rules to develop the future state from the current state, as well as 
formulate the appropriate action to achieve the desired future state (Endsley, 1995). This 
is an example of a complex task with high interactivity among the information elements 
loaded into working memory that can increase the cognitive load of the human. This 
process is more taxing for a novice, who does not have schemas based on experience or 
semantic memories from which to draw. Level 3 SA mirrors the second half of the orient 
stage of Boyd’s OODA loop discussed later in this chapter. 
1. SA Errors 
Due to limitations of the human cognitive architecture and sensor systems, perfect 
SA is realistically unachievable during combat operations. Errors may occur in perception, 
comprehension and projection levels of SA. For instance, a human may fail to perceive 
pertinent information or cues about the environment, leading to incomplete SA, or may 
misperceive an information element by assigning the incorrect value to the information 
element, leading to inaccurate SA (Endsley, 1995). These perceptual errors affect how a 
person comprehends the current state and can thus carry the error forward to the 
comprehension and projection levels of SA. Endsley (1995) stated that comprehension 
errors can also occur due to a myriad of causes, including lacking the correct mental model 
or drawing upon the incorrect mental model. Projecting future states relies heavily on 
experience. While a novice could perceive and understand the current state, experience is 
required for an individual to conduct the mental simulations necessary to predict a future 
state. Rasmussen attributed human error to distraction by non-relevant external 
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information, excessive task demand, variability intrinsic to humans, and deprecated human 
performance due to injury or sickness (Rasmussen, 1982).  
Endsley (1995) noted that a human’s SA may be incomplete or inaccurate due to 
failure to perceive (omission) or misperceiving (inaccuracy) relevant signals about the 
environment. Additionally, even if a human correctly perceives all relevant signals about 
the environment, a human’s SA could become flawed at Level 2 by failing to properly 
comprehend the signal’s meaning. Endsley (1995) offered that this could be caused by 
either lacking a relevant mental model or selecting the incorrect mental model to apply.  
2. Shared SA  
Situation awareness scales to teams of individuals. Bolstad, Cuevas, Gonzalez, and 
Schneider (2005) defined shared SA as “how similarly team members view a given 
situation” (p. 1). To achieve a high level of shared SA, teams must perceive and 
comprehend the current situation similarly and must project the same future state. To 
accomplish this, team members must convey perceived environmental information to other 
team members who have not perceived the information (Kanki, 2010). Shared SA does not 
require every team member to possess all of the environmental information that other team 
members perceive.  
3. Team SA 
Research makes the distinction between shared SA and team situation awareness 
(TSA). Endsley (1995) defined TSA as “the degree to which every team member possess 
the SA required for his or her responsibilities” (p. 8). Similar to individual SA, a team 
member’s task determines the individual’s SA requirements. One team member’s SA 
requirements may overlap with another team member’s SA requirements. Building upon 
Endsley’s TSA definition, Shu and Furuta (2005) defined TSA as, “two or more individuals 
share the common environment, up-to-the-moment understanding of situation of the 
environment, and another person’s interaction with the cooperative task” (p. 274). When 
one individual perceives information required by another team member, the perceiver must 
convey information to the other team member. Bolstad, Cuevas, Gonzalez, and Schneider 
(2005) found that increasing physical distance between team members negatively affected 
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mutual awareness among the team members due to reduced nonverbal communication and 
lack of a shared environment. Shared mental models among team members may reduce the 
need to communicate every piece of environmental information to team members who 
require the SA generating information (Endsley, 1995).  
J. DECISION-MAKING 
In the military context, gaining and maintaining SA is not an end in itself but a 
means to make informed choices that alter the future state of reality. Understanding how 
humans cognitively make choices is important since these choices impact performance and 
can mean the difference between success and failure, or life and death, on the battlefield. 
1. Decision Theory 
Decision theory seeks to explain the reasoning behind how an entity makes the 
choices it makes (Nodelman & Allen, 2003). Hastie and Pennington (1995) defined 
decision making as “the deliberate choice of a course of action with the intention to produce 
a maximally desirable outcome” (p. 1). There are two broad categories of decision theories: 
normative and descriptive. Normative decision-making theories, such as expected utility 
theory and rational choice theory, seek to explain how humans should make decisions. 
Descriptive decision-making theories, such as prospect theory, seek to explain how humans 
actually make decisions instead of how they ought to make decisions (Mengov, 2015). The 
existence of both normative and descriptive decision-making theories underscores that 
human decision-making is not always optimal.  
2. Classification of Decisions 
Humans make many day-to-day decisions with little to no cognitive effort because 
the environment is static and the associated mental models are so well engrained that 
decisions are automatic and made without awareness. Other decisions are complex due to 
novel problem sets where the actor’s mental models either do not apply or require 
significant modification and mental simulation that incur significant cognitive load. Many 
decisions during combat planning and operations are complex, as they are made in dynamic 
environments where perfect SA in unachievable, often because vital information about 
 40 
certain aspects of the environment are not known. Since decision-making is the precursor 
to action, it is intuitive that decision-making is directly linked to one’s performance. It is 
vital to examine some of the major decision making models that attempt to explain how 
humans make decisions to improve their performance. 
3. Bounded Rationality 
Humans like to believe that they always make rational decisions, but most would 
agree that this is not the case. According to the theory of rational choice, rational decision 
making requires the decision maker to identify the complete set of alternatives, order the 
alternatives based on expected utility, and then choose the alternative that provides the 
highest expected utility (Doyle, 1999). Due to their cognitive limitations previously 
discussed, humans are incapable of perfect rationality when solving complex problems 
(Doyle, 1999; Simon, 1957). As such, these limitations constrain human decision-making. 
Perfect rationality argues that humans will always act in a manner that optimizes their 
utility by identifying and choosing the best possible action. As the body of research has 
shown, humans have finite cognitive capacity that often becomes overloaded when 
attempting to solve complex problems. This is not to say that humans are irrational, but 
that humans are rational within the bounds set by their cognitive limitations. Attempting to 
identify the complete set of possible solutions and identifying the optimal solution to a 
complex problem not only exceeds the human’s cognitive capacity but also the time 
allotted to choose a solution. Instead of searching for the optimal solution, humans work 
to find the first solution that is good enough or workable, rather than expending additional 
time and cognitive effort to find the optimal solution (Simon, 1957).  
4. Dual Process Theory  
The dual process theory suggests that humans possess two distinct cognitive 
information-processing and decision-making processes. Doyle (1999) referred to these 
systems as System 1 and System 2, but are also referred to as automatic and controlled 
information processing, respectively (see Figure 6). Humans rely heavily on System 1 for 
many situations faced every day, such as conversing with another person via primary 
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language, simple addition, and reacting to a speeding car. Many of these responses are 
acquired either through biology or by past experience.  
System 1 is characterized as intuitive thinking that occurs fast and automatically 
with minimal to no conscious thought. Therefore, System 1 requires very little cognitive 
capacity, but is influenced by emotion, and relies on past experience for pattern recognition 
to generate responses quickly. To decrease response time, System 1 uses shortcuts such as 
heuristics and pattern recognition. Using these shortcuts can result in making the wrong 
decision (Kahneman, 2011). Automatic processing, also known as automaticity, is the act 
of responding to stimuli without allocation of attention to the stimuli (LaBerge & Samuels, 
1974; Posner & Synder, 1975; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) stated that automatic processing arises from habits. The quintessential example of 
automatic processing is an experienced driver driving to work on an empty road. Often 
times, the experienced driver does not need to attend to the task of driving because it has 
become habitual, which is not the same experience for an inexperienced driver or an 
experienced driver driving in a new town. 
Humans use System 2, also referred to as controlled processing, when System 1 is 
unable to provide the appropriate response to the given situation. System 2 is more 
deliberate than System 1, but is slower and requires greater cognitive capacity and use of 
other cognitive processes, such as attention and focus (Kahneman, 2011). Hammond et al. 
(1987) summarized the characteristics of the respective information processing systems 
(see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6.  Relationship between Senses, System 1, and System 2. 
Source: Mengov (2015).  
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Figure 7.  System 1 and System 2 Characteristics. Source: 
Hammond et al. (1987). 
5. Decision-Making Models 
a. Boyd’s Decision-Making Loop 
The Boyd loop is a well-known decision-making model used in the U.S. military 
and elsewhere (see Figure 8). Boyd identified the need to make decisions faster relative to 
the enemy’s decision-making process to avoid losing in conflict (Coram, 2004). The 
decision loop consists of four steps—observe, orient, decide, and act—as well as feedback 
loops. This foundational framework displays how individuals sense and make sense of the 
environment, compare the predicted future state of the environment versus the desired 
future state, determine the action required to alter the predicted future state of the 
environment so that it more closely aligns with the desired future state, and then execute 
the desired action. The Boyd loop is similar to Endsley and Kaber’s (1999) four functions 
of information processing: display monitoring, options generation, optimal option 
selection, and option implementation. Additionally, Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 
(2000) identified four similar functions when proposing a framework for analyzing 
automating decisions and action selection: information acquisition, information analysis, 
decision-making and action selection, and action implementation, (see Appendix B).  
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Figure 8.  Boyd’s OODA Loop. Source: Coram (2004). 
b. Naturalistic Decision-Making 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) is a descriptive decision-making theory that 
seeks to explain and model how human experts actually make real-world decisions. 
Shanteau (1992) defined an expert as one who is recognized throughout their professional 
community as possessing the requisite skills and ability to perform at the peak level. 
Central to NDM is the argument that human experts normally do not generate, analyze, 
and evaluate multiple possible options against a set of measures to determine the action 
that achieves the optimal outcome (Klein, 2008). NDM argues that experts draw on prior 
experience and knowledge to make decisions under uncertainty with limited to no 
deliberation time that have high consequences for making the wrong decision. 
(Klein, 2008).  
c. Recognition-Primed Decision-Making Model 
Recognition-primed decision-making (RPD) is an NDM theory that argues that 
humans draw on their experiences to identify patterns or cues that determine the 
appropriate mental model and an associated action to activate followed by the simulation 
of the associated action and action adjustment (see Figure 9). Klein (2008) argued that the 
RPD is how people make good decisions without having to evaluate the quality of multiple 
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possible actions. There are two distinct aspects to RPD: the first aspect is the intuitive 
action of experience-based pattern-matching, followed by the conscious aspect of 
simulating and adjusting the default action to fit within the context of the perceived 
environment (Klein, 2008). Klein identified that RPD aligns with Kahneman’s System 1 
and System 2 theory in that the intuitive pattern-matching is similar to System 1 while the 
mental simulation of action adjustment closely aligns to System 2. Additionally, RPD 
acknowledges that the decision-maker will cease simulation and action adjustment once 
the action is determined to be satisfactory. This concept is similar to the idea of satisficing 
that Simon (1956) discussed.  
 
Figure 9.  Recognition-Primed Decision-Making. Source: Klein (2008). 
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d. Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum 
While dual process theory provides a framework that models two types of decision 
making—intuitive and analytical—the appropriateness of a binary processing system 
arises. Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) contended that decisions are not 
either purely intuitive or purely analytical, as Dual Process Theory suggests, but rather 
occur on a continuum with pure intuition at one extreme and pure analysis at the other, 
with common sense/quasi-rationality in the middle. Hammond et al. (1987) asserted that 
task characteristics drive cognition on a sliding scale between System 1 and System 2.  
e. Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC) 
Shattuck and Miller (2006) noted that previous Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM) models only captured the cognitive aspects of decision-making and omitted the 
impacts of technology use on human decision-making. Shattuck and Miller’s (2006) 
Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC), represented in Figure 10, showed how the 
dataset that comprises true reality is filtered due to the limitations of technological sensors 
to accurately and completely sense and display the data for human consumption. The 
information presented by technology that is then filtered through the human’s cognitive 
lenses may distort how the human perceives and comprehends what they believe to be true 
reality and therefore predicts a future state of their constructed true reality. Shattuck and 
Miller (2006) argued that individual traits, social influences, local context, and experience 
all from an individual’s cognitive lenses that are used to perceive, comprehend and project.  
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Figure 10.  Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition. Source: 
Shattuck and Miller (2006). 
f. Prospect Theory 
Since the limits of human cognition prevent humans from identifying the full set of 
possible alternatives and evaluating each alternative’s potential utility, it is important to 
understand how humans actually evaluate alternatives. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
found that when humans make decisions under economic uncertainty, they do not 
necessarily choose the alternative with the highest weighted average dollar outcome, as 
expected utility theory would suggest. Kahneman (2011) stated that Prospect Theory 
contains three underlying principles. The reference point principle states that decision 
makers use their current state as a basis to evaluate potential outcomes. The principle of 
diminishing sensitivity argues that individuals are less sensitive to differences in a gain or 
loss is the difference is small relative to the total gain or loss. For example, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) stated that the difference between making either $1000 or $1100 is smaller 
than the difference between making either $100 or $200. The final principle of prospect 
theory is loss aversion whereby people typically make decisions under risk or uncertainty 
that minimize exposure to loss versus maximizing exposure to gain. Loss aversion implies 
that the psychological effect from incurring a gain is less than the effect from incurring a 
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loss of the same absolute value as the gain (see Figure 11). Kahneman attributed this 
manner of thinking and decision-making to System 1, which is discussed next (Doyle, 
1999; Kahneman, 2011). 
 
Figure 11.  Prospect Theory Model. Source: Kahneman (2011). 
6. Evaluating Decisions 
Evaluating individual decisions is important because decision-making is the 
precursor to performance. From a normative decision-making perspective, Ronald (1988) 
underscored the importance of not evaluating a decision based on the outcome of the 
decision since good decisions can result in bad outcomes due to the uncertainty inherent in 
dynamic environments. A good decision is one that is logically sound based on what 
alternatives the individual perceives, while a good outcome is a future state that is more 
desirable to other possible future states (Howard, 1988). Errors in perception, 
comprehension, and projection can cause an individual to select the incorrect mental model 
(Endsley, 1995). These errors can negatively affect an individual’s decision-making 
process and performance of the chosen option/task by extension. For instance, the 
individual may choose to implement an option that they would not have chosen to 
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implement if an error in situation awareness had not occurred. Individuals can also commit 
errors during the execution of a task, preventing the achievement of the future state desired. 
Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness can be developed to evaluate an 
individual’s decision-making process and task performance.  
Measures of performance (MOP) are metrics that evaluate the performance of a 
task (Joint Chiefs of Staff J-7, 2013). While MOP are designed to evaluate task 
performance, MOP can be designed to evaluate an individual’s decision-making process 
as well. Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are metrics designed to evaluate the impact that 
performing a task has on achieving the desired state or the mission’s objective (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff J-7, 2013). Kulisz and Sharp (2017) argued that MOP and MOE should be designed 
and utilized to evaluate task performance and task performance effectiveness, regardless 
of whether the task is performed by a human, a machine, or a combination. 
K. TEAMING 
Many applications, from business and sports to warfare, utilize teams. Teams are 
useful when a task is so complex or complicated that it exceeds the cognitive capabilities 
or skill sets of one individual. Members of teams must interact interdependently to 
accomplish a shared goal or task through intra-team communication to coordinate effort 
(Salas & Fiore, 2004). 
1. Human-Machine Teaming 
In many applications, such as financial trading and hyper war, competition drives 
the adoption of AI into human-machine teams. Competitors will adopt new technology to 
gain a competitive advantage and those that fail to adapt will no longer be able to compete. 
The stated need for human-machine teaming (HMT) is found in military and civil strategy 
documents such as DoD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (DoD, 2013) and 
National Robotics Initiative 2.0: Ubiquitous Collaborative Robots (National Science 
Foundation, 2017).  
HMT seeks to achieve performance gains and error reduction. Cognitive diversity, 
sensory diversity, distribution of workload, attentional overlaps, pooled experience, and 
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task specialization are all examples of areas where human-only teams can outperform 
human individuals (Kanki, 2010; Reynolds & Lewis, 2017). The human cognitive factors 
in the literature review demonstrate the limitations on any single individual to perceive, 
process and react to the situation optimally. A team task can leverage the distributed 
perception, concentration, intellect, and experience of multiple individuals and, correctly 
executed, can apply the entire effort to the task. A comparison of human and machine 
cognitive processes and their relative merits reveals the ways in which complimentary 
attributes can combine to deliver robust team capabilities. 
Teamwork necessitates the distribution and integration of shared and decomposed 
tasks to achieve the common goal. The communication of the common goal, sharing 
information about the environment, identifying capacity to complete tasks within the team, 
and the aggregation of the completed tasks are all examples of places where teams have an 
overhead coordination task. Human-machine interfaces exist as the communications 
interface to share data, task, and state information between human and machine team 
members. While humans communicate through verbal and non-verbal cues, machines have 
different primary communication channels than human team members. AIs receive 
information through keyboards, touchscreens, computer vision, and natural language 
processing inputs and can query or report to human team members through visual displays, 
audio-tones, warning lights or synthetic speech. 
The literature on human team performance shows the central importance of 
communication for team effectiveness through information transfer, task monitoring and 
SA, reinforcing relationships, and affirming predictable behavior (Kanki, 2010; Merry, 
Weller, & Mitchell, 2014). Human-machine teams also require effective communication 
between human and machine team members. Psychologist and computer science pioneer 
J.C.R. Licklider envisioned a system capable of enabling humans and computers to 
cooperate in decision-making and controlling systems in dynamic environments. 
Licklider’s early work, “Man-Computer Symbiosis” acknowledged the importance of 
human-machine interface design in the implementation of a dynamic human-machine team 
(Licklider, 1960). Parasuraman and Riley (1997) echoed findings on the importance of 
two-way interaction and communication between humans and automated systems. 
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Thompson (1967) developed a useful tool to analyze the task environment to 
determine the appropriate coordination mechanism to distribute and reintegrate distributed 
labor at the organizational level. Figure 12 is a graphical depiction adapted from 
Thompson’s model. A deterministic closed system task environment is well-suited to 
pooled interdependence, where task units submit completed work for integration at the next 
higher organizational echelon. A predictable input-output relationship that is unaffected by 
external factors allows single task units to operate effectively, requiring minimal 
coordination overhead to adjust to environmental changes or system feedback effects. A 
dynamic operational environment with complicated interactions and an open system 
necessitates that team members act with a reciprocal coordination process with frequent 
lateral coordination to respond to changes and feedback in the system.  
 
Figure 12.  Environmental Coordination Requirements for Teaming Model. 
Adapted from Thompson (1967) and Johnson et al. (2014).  
2. Coactive Design 
Coactive design is a theory developed in response to an increasing demand to 
employ machines as teammates of humans instead of as agents that operate independently 
of humans. Based on Thompson’s Organizational Theory, coactive design poses that the 
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subsequent actions of a team member of an interdependent team completing a joint activity 
is reciprocal and mutually constraining. Johnson et al., (2014) defined interdependence as 
“the set of complementary relationships that two or more parties rely on to manage required 
(hard) or opportunistic (soft) dependencies in joint activity” (p. 47). Dependencies arise 
when an entity of the team does not possess the capacity (knowledge, skills, or abilities) 
required to complete a task and therefore requires another team member’s assistance to 
complete the task.  
Johnson et al. (2014) argued that additional requirements of observability, 
predictability, and directability (OPD) exist in interdependent and reciprocal relationships 
that do not exist when an individual completes the same task alone. The coactive design 
model is based on an abstract interface between the robot and the human teammates that 
facilitates OPD. Johnson et al. (2014) defined observability as “making pertinent aspects 
of one’s status, as well as one’s knowledge of the team, task, and environment observable 
to other” (p. 51). Predictability implies that “one’s actions should be predictable enough 
that others can reasonably rely on them when considering their own action” (Johnson et al., 
2014, p. 52). Lastly, directability means “one’s ability to direct the behavior of others and 
complementarily be directed by others is the ability of one team member to direct the 
behavior and actions of other team members as well as the ability to be directed by other 
team members” (Johnson et al., 2014, p. 52). Johnson et al. (2014) proposed that by using 
OPD as a framework for designing user interfaces, a designer could identify and design to 
the interdependent relationship requirements that enable a robot to serve as a teammate in 
a joint activity.  
3. Crew Resource Management and Workload Management 
Military and Civil Aviation exemplify areas of practice where automated systems 
are used by teams of humans; Crew Resource Management (CRM) is the term that 
describes the measures and methods developed by NASA, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and industry to address the necessary processes to handle the 
incidental complexity of operating in teams with human and machine agents.  
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Kanki, Helmreich, and Anca (2010) noted the improvements to safety in airline 
operations as automation of cognitive tasks increased. Combinations of humans and 
automation in aviation of certain tasks also allowed the reduction of crew sizes as the role 
of navigators and radio operators was consumed by computers; but researchers also 
observed that an unintended consequence of highly competent automation is an erosion in 
human skill and proficiency in those automated tasks with negative outcomes when 
automation fails (Hancock et al., 2013). Automation error and automation state awareness 
are frequently cited as causes in aviation mishap investigations. These failures can easily 
trace to Johnson et al.’s (2014) requirements for Observability, Predictability, and 
Directability in the design of human-machine teams. When the humans cannot correctly 
observe the states of the automation, such as input and output variables, and the operational 
modes, they cannot effectively monitor or trust the system by predicting the outcomes of 
the current state. When the humans cannot predict the performance of the automation 
because of lack of knowledge of the system, opaque interface design, or unpredictable 
internal functions, the human cannot leverage the automation as a reliable team member.  
Humans must also be observable, predictable, and directable for AI to be effective 
in the human-machine team. Since humans cannot be re-engineered for OPD in the same 
manner as AI, HMT employment training and education is required to increase 
understanding about and accommodation for human team member OPD. Observability and 
directability of human team members by AI requires effective interface design to provide 
the machine team member the necessary information on the human team member’s state. 
This ability for a machine to solicit state information and suggest or direct action, and have 
a reasonable ability to predict human teammates’ responses to changes in the environment 
illustrates that OPD is critical in a reciprocal team relationship, whether the team is a 
human-machine or a human-only construct. OPD is facilitated by training the human team 
members in SOPs that the AI are designed around, and in educating the team members 
about the value of compliance in effective HMT. Dickson and Wickens (2006) addressed 
the obligation of compliance with expectations designed into the AI, ensuring the human 
team members understand the necessary inputs and interactions they must perform to 
achieve effective HMT performance. 
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Human team members require interaction in a format they can understand. Humans 
are capable of perceiving verbal and non-verbal cues, and can make some diagnostic 
assessments of the current state of a team member or team member’s task by observing the 
shared environment. Machine agents can be designed for all those interactions but the level 
of engineering effort required to design a Machine Agent that can interpret a shoulder shrug 
to indicate a lack of information should be quickly outweighed by a design decision to 
formally inquire for an input from an existing HMI device, such as a button input or formal 
voice command. 
NIST research by Alubs, Barbera, Scott and Balakirsky into control systems for 
teams of manned and unmanned systems centered on a scenario where manned High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) collaborate with Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles and Unmanned Ground Vehicles in a route reconnaissance task. The 
reconnaissance HMT scenario emphasized the iterative communication and task 
assignment between automated and human team-members where the unmanned systems 
depend on the human team for goal setting and course of action selection, and the humans 
depend on the sensor range and diversity of the unmanned system. The humans are 
occupied with a poorly-defined problem regarding the load-bearing capacity of a bridge 
while the unmanned systems attend to well-defined problems of searching assigned areas 
for navigable routes and hostile force (Albus, Barbera, Scott, & Balakirsky, 2005). Dorner 
and Funke (2017) differentiated between ill- (poorly) defined problems and well-defined 
problems, in that well-defined problems possess clear desired goals and means to achieve 
those goals, while an ill-defined problem is not easily framed, lacks a clear goal and lacks 
the means to achieve the goal. 
Research by Chen and Joyner (2009) for the Army Research Laboratory focused 
on a human tank gunner concurrently operating a robotic surveillance system. In this case, 
the human-machine team consisted of the human gunner, the surveillance robot and the 
automation systems that assist the human in gunnery tasks. The findings showed that 
absence of automation assistance in operating the remote robotic system decreased the 
human gunner’s performance in primary gunnery tasks and communication with other 
teammates. The findings further showed that automated system assistance on gunnery tasks 
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had performance benefits on the primary gunnery tasks as well as the secondary robotics 
tasks, possibly attributable to reduced workload and an ability to properly allocate mental 
resources. 
Chen, Durlach, Sloan, and Bowens (2008) also used a route reconnaissance 
scenario for HMT research. The primary findings of the research suggested that increasing 
the number of machine assets assigned to human-machine teams demonstrably degraded 
the team performance if the cognitive work was not distributed or deferred to automated 
control systems. Dixon, Wickens, and Chang (2003) studied pilots searching for targets 
while automated control systems performed primary flying tasks, with increased effects 
when pilots were responsible for flying and monitoring more than one system.  
The common threads of HMT research in military-use cases point to the importance 
of interdependence design and the value of shared functional allocation. Many researchers 
recognized the need for dynamic interaction between humans and automated systems as a 
result of the dynamic military task environment. A unifying trend in the literature is the 
goal of reducing human labor and risk exposure, which automation has delivered in 
industrial and manufacturing applications. While the military has had some success in 
mitigating physical risk with unmanned systems, the manual teleoperation approach of 
many military unmanned systems has not yet delivered labor reduction in remote systems.  
a. Trust 
Trust is unique to the team environment. A solitary soldier, paramedic, or pilot is 
not cognitively burdened with a trust interaction unless there is a teammate or system in 
which he or she has to place trust in. The preeminence of trust in interdependent 
interpersonal relationships is asserted by Simpson (2007).  
Beer et al.’s (2014) Framework (see Appendix B) only attributed trust as a factor 
to the human side of a Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). Beer et al. (2014) noted trust as a 
variable of the HRI in their autonomy framework, but did not suggest that robots should 
assess or model trust of the human team members Johnson’s Coactive Design suggested 
that Observability, Predictability, and Directability (OPD) must exist on both sides of an 
interdependent relationship. The synthesis of Beer et al. (2014) and Johnson et al. (2011) 
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presents the possibility that trust and OPD, while not synonymous, should be considered 
as two sides of the reciprocal relationship of humans and machines in teams. Given the 
demonstrated fallibility of human cognition, HMTs could benefit from design efforts that 
include a trust factor for AI that inform the interaction with humans. In the same way that 
humans should not blindly trust, accept or consent to automated systems input, the HMT 
could benefit from design efforts that make the automated system a healthy skeptic in the 
interdependent relationship, enabled by a capacity to sense, process, and evaluate 
confirming and disconfirming evidence around information received from human 
teammates. 
Trust can be a barrier to acceptance of automation by humans. Gray proposes that 
the human-side component of interpersonal trust is founded in mutual concern, a shared 
sense of vulnerability, and faith in competence (Gray, 2017). The “faith in competence” 
elements parse well into the critical factors of human trust in automation related to 
reliability, validity, utility, robustness, and false alarm rate (Hoffman, Johnson, Bradshaw, 
& Underbrink, 2013; Dixon & Wickens, 2006) and can be modeled for machine agents to 
establish a faith in competence model for human teammate performance. The shared 
vulnerability and mutual concern are more nebulous concepts and are a high engineering 
hurdle to achieve for the machine agents in current technology. Overtrust is also a concern 
of Parasuraman, Molloy and Singh (1993), who indicated that trust in performance beyond 
the capability of the automation can create reduced team performance, with Bradshaw et 
al. (2013) finding that impacts of overtrust, under-reliance, and their cognitive burden are 
not well understood. 
In Hancock et al.’s (2013) study of the body of work on Human-Automation 
Interaction, Wickens posited that the negative costs of human-machine teaming occur in 
non-routine situations when the automated systems are “out of their depth,” and the humans 
underperform in the non-routine response due to complacency or a diminished competence 
resulting from not practicing the roles that routine automation assumes. It is suggested that 
mitigation of the potential adverse cost of automation may be achieved through improved 
interface design and training human crews in understanding the logic of the automated 
system. 
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L. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the relevant body of research in the fields of machine 
cognition and AI, human cognition and decision making, and HMT. While it is impossible 
to conduct an exhaustive review of each of these fields, the research conducted here 
provides a solid baseline for understanding the major positions in each. The term autonomy 
is a suitcase term that creates visions of intelligent machines capable of completing 
complex tasks in complex environments without human input or supervision better than a 
human. While humans have specific cognitive limitations, they also have certain cognitive 
capabilities that facilitate developing unique solutions to novel problem sets in a dynamic 
environment that machine cognition cannot currently perform. Teaming humans and 
machines together fuses the cognitive strengths and covers the limitations of each; 
however, a cost to coordinating in a team environment and trust concerns exist that may 
overload the human cognitive capacity and eliminate any potential benefit that exists from 
teaming. The next chapter presents a succinct methodology of creating a framework that 
assists with determining the optimal team composition for performing a particular task. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature to provide contextual 
background regarding how best to integrate humans and machines to optimize task 
performance. This chapter first synthesizes the core issue and then details the methodology 
used to develop an analytic tool and framework for exploring human-machine team 
performance related to cognition. 
B. SYNTHESIS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ISSUE 
Since 2013, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has pursued a line of research in 
partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School known as Unmanned Tactical 
Autonomous Command and Control (UTACC). The UTACC program seeks to design and 
implement a semi-autonomous system in a fire team to enhance the fire team’s 
performance. One cognitive load issue is that providing a fire team with machine 
teammates may not necessarily improve the team’s performance. Due to the potential 
misalignment of team composition with the task and task environment, providing a fire 
team with machine teammates may, in fact, create the opposite effect: increasing cognitive 
overload situations resulting in poor team performance. Despite the increased use of 
computer systems, outside of aviation the military places little emphasis on designing 
systems to account for human cognitive abilities and limitations. As a result, military 
systems are not intuitive and quickly overload the user’s cognitive capacity, leading to sub-
optimal decision making. Additionally, many emerging military strategic concepts show a 
desire to employ military systems that are void of human input. While this may be desired 
for certain types of tasks, such as the dull, dirty, and dangerous, there are other tasks where 
cooperation between humans and machines may be more advantageous. Having noticed 
this issue, the authors set out to find a solution to cognitive load resulting from 
misalignment of the cognitive abilities of human-machine teams and task requirements. 
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C. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
This research intends to increase understanding of how decision-makers can 
improve performance through proper alignment of the unique cognitive capabilities of 
humans and machines working interdependently. This thesis leverages research previously 
performed in the fields of human cognition, decision making, situation awareness, machine 
cognition and organizational behavior to analyze the cognitive capabilities and limitations 
of humans and machines. The authors applied extensive research to develop a tool that can 
assist operational planners, strategists, acquisition professionals, and programmers in 
determining the key factors to consider when identifying the construct of a team to perform 
a particular task. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The authors began by thoroughly reviewing relevant prior research regarding 
human cognition, SA, and decision-making; machine cognition taxonomy; and teaming. 
This review, detailed in Chapter II, provided background knowledge required to understand 
the complexities of human-machine teaming.  
In Chapter IV, the authors will analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
human cognition and machine cognition. Since machine cognition continues to evolve and 
gain additional cognitive capabilities, framework users need to carefully consider the 
cognitive capabilities and limitation of potential machine agents. Understanding each 
agent’s cognitive capabilities is critical to proper task-agent alignment. 
The authors will combine Paas and Van Merriënboer’s (1994) cognitive load model 
with Johnson’s Coactive Design OPD requirements to develop a more comprehensive 
high-level tool to assist users in understanding the cognitive load factors of human-machine 
teaming. Paas and Van Merriënboer’s model captures the three broad cognitive load factors 
for an individual (task and environment, individual, and task-individual interactions), but 
it does not break out intra-team coordination factors explicitly. The authors see the need 
for a model that incorporates team cognitive factors and, therefore, will create a new tool. 
By explicitly incorporating the team cognitive factors, the proposed tool will gain the 
flexibility to extend to teams as well.  
 59 
The authors will consolidate the major considerations identified in the literature 
review into a single framework that aids the user in determining, from a cognitive 
perspective, the optimal individual/ team model and agent(s) construct to perform a specific 
task. The framework will assist the user analyze the task and the environment to understand 
the resulting cognitive load. The framework will also assist the user in understanding the 
prospective agents’ cognitive capabilities and how the agents cognitively fit with the task 
and the task environment. The framework will need to facilitate identifying the 
coordination requirements and mechanisms when employing a team of agents. The authors 
will develop a simple-use case example to demonstrate how to use the framework and 
the tool. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter briefly revisited relevant background UTACC program information 
and the underlying research problem to provide the context to understand the need for an 
analytical framework and tool. Additionally, this chapter discussed the need for the 
proposed tool and framework and the broad developmental steps used to create each. The 
subsequent chapter will discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of human and 
machine cognition, the impact of cognitive load on decision making, the framework and 
tool the authors developed. 
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IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities. 
—MCRP 6–11 (United States Marine Corps, 1999) 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the authors’ analysis of human and machine cognition, 
cognitive performance, and a Framework to guide studies of human-machine team design 
for effective cognitive work. The chapter is arranged in three parts. It begins with an 
analysis of human and machine cognitive performance as it relates to Task Functional 
Allocation, followed by a description of the Team-Task Cognitive Analysis Framework 
(TTCAF) and concludes with a TTCAF use-case example and the Team-Task Cognitive 
Diagram (TTCD) tool. In the first half of the chapter, the authors analyze task functional 
allocation and the cognitive abilities of machines and humans. Next the authors explore the 
impact of cognitive load on performance. Third, the authors will examine the significant 
risks to successful human-machine teams.  
The second half of the chapter is divided into two parts. First, the authors propose 
and explain the TTCAF and the TTCD tool. Next, the authors apply the TTCAF and the 
TTCD tool to a use-case scenario to model how to use these items and display their 
benefits. 
B. FUNCTION ALLOCATION 
The question of function allocation in human-machine teams is central to the 
problem of HMT performance. Function allocation decisions are typically preceded by the 
Men-are-better at…, Machines-are-better-at… (MABA-MABA) type comparisons, 
beginning with Fitts in the 1950s and continuing in recent research. Dekker and Woods 
(2002) noted that the interaction of humans and machines presents a different performance 
in each than could be observed when either operates in isolation. Woods (2002) further 
developed these ideas and challenged the common opinion that the value of automation 
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could be fully realized through simple substitution of humans with machines. Fitts’s list 
(Fitts et al., 1951) exposed the value of the HMT counterpart in mitigating agent’s 
performance shortfalls, and informed the development of the “Un-Fitt’s List,” shown in 
Figure 13, that explicitly described the ways in which HMT counterparts serve each other 
and the task (Bradshaw, Dignum, Jonker, & Sierhuis, 2012). 
 
Figure 13.  The “Un-Fitt’s List.” Source: Bradshaw et al. (2012). 
C. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF MACHINE COGNITION 
Artificial Intelligence is capable of remarkable feats of mathematical and logic 
processing, but can also fail completely to replicate some cognitive functions of simple 
animals. Research by Fitts for the FAA in the 1950s, on the relative merits of Machine and 
Human cognition, has endured as a resource for designers considering the question of 
function allocation (de Winter & Dodou, 2014). Fitts credited machines with superior 
performance compared to human counterparts in calculation speed, repetition, replication, 
logical deduction, and multitasking. Fitts et al. (1951) found that machines were weaker in 
improvisation inductive reasoning; judgment; and efficient, rapid, recall of relevant 
information with context from long-term memory. 
Artificial Intelligence is particularly well-suited for rule-based cognition in narrow, 
well-defined problems. Artificial Intelligence can automate ably simple tasks, recognize 
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patterns, apply rules, process information, react quickly, and perform well in almost any 
narrow, well-defined logical task. Machine Intelligence is not suited to domains and 
scenarios where the machine must determine the context of the task or exercise empathy 
or complex judgement (Bradshaw et al., 2012; Dulny et al., 2017; Button, 2017).  
Recent research into vulnerabilities of AI and Machine Learning (ML) have 
highlighted some critical factors for consideration. The opacity of the internal process of 
ML technology, in particular, is also problematic as the systems cannot expose or explain 
their internal processes (Hoffman, Johnson, Bradshaw, & Underbrink, 2013). Machine 
Cognition is a product of its human creators and the human-tagged data on which ML is 
trained. This human heritage can result in bias and error in the ML algorithms (Osoba & 
Welser IV, 2017) that propagate at the massive speed and scale that Machine Cognition 
delivers (Dulny et al., 2017). Gu, Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg (2017) found that the common 
practice of outsourcing ML training data exposes the algorithm to back-door injection in 
the training sets that are difficult to detect and could be exploited once implemented. Other 
attack methods using adversarial AIs to iteratively manipulate ML models proved 
successful in causing substantial errors in ML processes (Cisse, Adi, Neverova, & 
Keshet, 2017). 
D. STRENGTHS OF HUMAN COGNITION 
While it is easy to discount human cognition based on its inherent limitations, 
human cognition does have its merits. Humans are capable of developing cognitive 
expertise in a wide variety of fields and disciplines. Not only can humans develop a high 
level of expertise in a single field or discipline, they are also generalists in that a human 
can develop varying levels of skills in multiple fields and disciplines. This ability is 
facilitated by the human’s expansive long-term memory that can store the episodic, 
procedural, and semantic memories as well as the mental models for a wide range of tasks. 
While not perfect, humans are also cognitively capable of processing incomplete 
information. 
Another key strength of human cognition is that they have dual information 
processing systems. While System 2 is more analytical, it is significantly slower than 
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System 1. If humans had to process everything through System 2, simple tasks such as 
walking and talking would constantly overload working memory and exceed cognitive 
capacity, limiting a person’s ability to respond automatically to stimuli. Conversely, 
humans still require System 2 for complex tasks that require attention to complete. Without 
the slower and effortful System 2, the advancement of human civilization would not be 
possible. 
Humans are uniquely capable of dealing in ambiguous, vague, and uncertain 
cognitive problems. Humans process information in the situational context in which the 
human received the information. Therefore, humans may apply different meanings to the 
same piece of information depending on the situational context of the information in which 
it was received. Humans also have a creative ability and are not, therefore, bound by the 
existing set of solutions or ideas. If a solution is not available for a novel problem, an 
individual will not return an error but will develop a unique solution that satisfices the 
problem set. Humans do not require complete information but rather can exercise judgment 
without having all of the information necessary for understanding or decision-making. This 
capacity for ambiguity is critical in the military context since available information is rarely 
complete. Klein (2008) argued that experts with prior experience with a given situation 
need less information to recognize the situation and recall the correct schema than does 
a novice. 
E. WEAKNESSES OF HUMAN COGNITION 
Human cognition is arguably the most advanced cognitive system in the animal 
kingdom, but it does have its flaws. These weaknesses impact the human’s information 
processing system, specifically perception, attention, working memory, choice 
identification and selection, and implementation.  
A person’s limited attentional capacity requires the person to prioritize allocation 
of attention to the seemingly infinite sources of stimuli based on relevancy to the current 
task and state. When performing a task that requires a significant amount of attention, little 
to no attentional capacity remains for other stimuli. As a result, the human may perceive 
but does not encode other key information elements about the environment. A dynamic 
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environment, with multiple competing task priorities and attention cues, is common in 
military operations. In a busy, loud, life-threatening situation, task and attention overload 
can result in a human agent missing important cues and signals. There are historical 
examples where even experienced aviators prosecuting ground targets become target-
fixated and fail to pay attention to altitude warnings during prosecution, crashing into the 
ground. Additionally, the human ability to maintain attention for extended periods and 
during periods of low stimulus is limited. Attentional fatigue and low arousal could cause 
a service-member to overlook a significant environmental cue. Marines who perform 
garrison guard duties at night are often susceptible to both of these conditions, as they have 
typically worked a full day already and are expected to maintain a high level of alert at 
night when there is little to no activity to stimulate attention. 
Human working memory’s limited capacity (Miller, 1956) affects a human’s speed 
and accuracy when performing complex mental operations. For example, most humans 
cannot divide a three-digit number into another three-digit number in their head quickly 
and accurately. Most individuals require a pen and paper and the appropriate mental model 
to arrive at the correct answer. Working memory capacity is certainly reduced in a military 
context due to the existence of significant mental and physical fatigue, as well as increased 
stress levels due to the inherently dangerous environment. 
Human cognition is intrinsically variable and imprecise. Not only can a human’s 
cognitive capabilities vary day to day depending on exogenous and endogenous factors, 
but cognitive capabilities will also vary person to person. Variation exists because of the 
biological and experiential differences between persons. Variation provides valuable 
perspective and cognitive diversity in a team dynamic, but also leads to imprecision and 
inconsistencies.  
As a result of working memory and attention limitation, humans have developed 
adaptations that do not always lead to the optimal choice. Heuristics use reduces the 
complexity of a problem or task but also sacrifices accuracy and optimization for speed. In 
a similar vein, the human tendency for satisficing, rather than elaborate optimization, does 
not guarantee the optimal choice is selected. 
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F. COGNITIVE LOAD IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING QUALITY  
Cognitive load impacts decision-making quality via its effect on situation 
awareness. According to Sweller et al. (2011), when a task’s cognitive requirements exceed 
the available capacity of working memory and attention, the individual is unable to achieve 
understanding. Only when an individual is able to store all of the interacting information 
elements in working memory will the individual be able to achieve understanding. 
Sweller et al.’s (2011) definition of understanding is similar to Endsley’s definition of 
comprehension: “the understanding of the significance of those elements in light of 
pertinent operator goals” (Endsley, 1995, p. 6). Hence, understanding and comprehension 
are essentially synonymous. If an individual’s cognitive load is so high that it exceeds the 
cognitive capacity of the individual, then the individual will be unable to achieve 
understanding and Level II SA. A cognitively overloaded individual’s SA will at most 
achieve Level I: perception. 
Rarely does the military environment present an individual with only a single task 
to complete where the individual can allocate all cognitive capacity to that single task. 
Individuals are more likely to have multiple tasks concurrently competing for cognitive 
resourcing. The load that one task induces on an individual’s cognitive processes, 
specifically attention and working memory, reduces the cognitive capacity that the 
individual has available to allocate to other tasks. As Wickens (2002) concluded, gaining 
and maintaining SA is an enduring task that requires cognitive resources and invokes a 
load on one’s cognitive processes. Gaining and maintaining higher levels of SA requires 
more cognitive resources than lower levels of SA. In other words, simply perceiving the 
environment induces an initial cognitive load on an individual, considering and applying 
meaning to what was perceived, which induces an additional cognitive load. Building on 
that perception and meaning to project a future state of the environment adds another layer 
of complexity and the heaviest cognitive burden. 
Then there is the issue of dynamic environments. Gaining and maintaining a given 
level of SA in a dynamic environment will induce a higher cognitive load than achieving 
the same level of SA in a static environment. In a dynamic environment, the individual 
must constantly incorporate new information perceived about the environment to validate 
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or invalidate the current mental model of the environment. Additionally, a novice will 
require more cognitive resources to gain and maintain higher SA levels than an expert. 
Allocating cognitive resources to other tasks reduces the cognitive resources available for 
allocation to gaining and maintaining SA, thereby limiting the level and accuracy of SA 
gained.  
Accurate SA is a prerequisite of optimal decision-making (Endsley, 1995), because 
cognitively optimal decisions rely on accurate perception, interpretation, and future 
projection. SA is an input to the decision-making process, and choice-based action 
represents the outcome of the decision making process. Individuals execute actions in the 
context of their perception and comprehension of the current environment to alter their 
projected future state to align more closely with their desired future state. If an individual 
incorrectly or incompletely comprehends the current environmental state, they may project 
a future state that does not closely align with the actual future state. As a result, the 
individual may not choose the most optimal action to execute. Conversely, if an 
individual’s projected future state closely aligns with the actual future state, then he or she 
is more likely to choose the action that may have an appropriate impact on the 
environmental state to achieve the desired future state.  
G. HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING RISKS 
Human-Machine Teams present the potential for dramatic performance gains in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiencies, but human-machine teaming is not a silver bullet 
solution to all problems. HMT design and practice must consider and mitigate the potential 
adverse byproducts. Research in commercial aviation has shown that overreliance on 
automation can result in short-term complacency, reduced SA, and long-term skill and 
performance atrophy (Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey, 2014). 
Measures to prevent overreliance include Adaptive Automation technologies that measure 
the contribution of the automation to maintain the engagement of the human team member 
with the task (Hancock et al., 2013; Parasuraman, Cosenzo, & De Visser, 2009). 
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1. Trust 
Teammates must have a mutual trust for teaming to be valuable. A team member 
that is not trusted to perform reliably, complete assigned tasks, or communicate relevant 
information, does nothing to reduce the workload of teammates. New technology begins 
life in the team-context with a blank slate of trust, and it takes time to create trust before 
the technology can be trusted as a teammate. Introducing automation or any technology-
enabled process change brings with it a time-to-train and learning curve that must be 
understood, designed around, and evaluated. Davis (1985) noted the cognitive barriers that 
humans must overcome before accepting technology. Building trust and acceptance of 
technology increases with reliable performance and clear expectations just as it does in 
human-only teams. 
One hurdle to integrating Machine Learning (ML) AI, specifically black box 
systems, is ML’s inability to explain or justify how it arrives at an answer that it provides 
to its human teammate. A teammate, human or machine, must be able to explain how it 
arrived at a given answer in order for teammates to make sense of and rely on the answer 
provided, and to build and maintain team trust. If the machine AI provides an answer that 
the human teammate was not anticipating, the human will seek to understand why the 
machine AI provided the answer. If the machine AI is unable to provide justification, then 
the human teammate is less likely to rely on the answer (Hoffman, Johnson, Bradshaw & 
Underbrink, 2013). Observability and Predictability are essential components of team trust. 
The dynamics of team cohesion in the presence of machine teammates has not been 
well-studied. Psychologist Kurt Gray’s research into AI as a teammate noted that mutual 
concern, shared sense of vulnerability, and faith in competence are the pillars of human 
team trust (Gray, 2017). The shared culture, values, and experiences of humans in military 
teams serve to build these pillars, but the trust relationship with machine teammates will 
likely hinge primarily on faith in competence as seen through the lens of OPD, and may be 
difficult to reestablish when lost.  
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2. Interface Design  
Teammates have to communicate, and for human-machine teams the 
communication happens through Human-machine interface devices. Lights, keyboards, 
touchscreens, buzzers, horns, and pushbuttons are common means for humans to 
communicate with machines. Unfortunately, as the complexity of systems increase, the 
design of the interface does not always keep pace. Interface design between HMT 
teammates impacts the burden of cognitive load that is created in communicating 
information between teammates. Well-designed interfaces are critical for effective teams 
as the interface is the conduit for sharing mental models, distributing tasks, reintegrating 
work, as well as gaining and maintaining individual and team SA. Applying Sweller’s 
concepts of intrinsic and extraneous cognitive loads to a communication interface between 
teammates, a teammate’s intrinsic cognitive load results from the information passed 
through the interface, while the extraneous load is based on how the interface presents the 
information to the individuals to perceive. For instance, performing a file-management task 
on a Disk Operating System command prompt is not as intuitive as performing the same 
task with desktop type graphical user interface and therefore most likely imparts a higher 
extraneous load as a result. A poorly designed interface between human and machine 
teammates has the potential to overload the cognitive capacity of the human teammate, 
reducing the effectiveness of the entire team and negatively affecting the perceived ease of 
use of the machine teammate. Additionally, poor interface design results in reduced OPD, 
increased cognitive load, poor communication, reduced SA and mental models, and poor 
decisions and outcomes. 
H. TEAM-TASK COGNITIVE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
The primary contribution of this research to the literature is the Team-Task 
Cognitive Analysis Framework (TTCAF) as an analytic approach to the design of human-
machine teams performing cognitive work. The authors divided the TTCAF into three 
sections, each comprised of multiple steps (see Tables 1, 2, and 3).  
The TTCAF’s sections are Section 1: Task/Subtask Cognitive Factor Analysis 
Team; Section 2: Composition/Agent to Task Matching; and Section 3: Team Coordination 
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Demands and Mechanisms. TTCAF incorporates the associated Team-Task Cognitive 
Diagram (TTCD) visual description tool intended to guide users through a rigorous design 
analysis for human-machine teams in an operational environment. The intended users of 
the TTCAF are acquisitions professionals, capabilities and requirements developers, and 
HMT team members seeking to improve their processes and performance outcomes.  
The TTCAF integrates the established literature on human-autonomy functional 
allocation together with the dynamic factors that affect team performance on cognitive 
tasks. The authors intend for the framework to be used as a tool for designing and 
evaluating solutions involving human-machine-teams. The TTCAF sections and steps 
present tools, concepts, terms and references to the literature to guide a detailed 
consideration of HMT design for a specific task or use case. The TTCAF informs a design 
focused on optimizing cognitive performance that embraces the capabilities and limitations 
of the team’s agents, and mitigates the performance burden of team coordination. The 
TTCAF’s respective sections address team design through the analysis of the nature of the 
task and subtasks, the suitability of the assigned agents to subtasks, and the coordination 
mechanisms through which teams share SA and make decisions. 
The first section of the TTCAF, Task/Subtask Cognitive Factor Analysis, considers 
the mission or task identified as the focus of the design problem, in terms that apply to 
cognitive load (see Table 1). The task may need to be decomposed to a granular level 
through a method such as Work Breakdown Structure or a Process Flow Diagram to avoid 
an overly broad or generic analysis. Narrowing the scope of analysis into a set of subtasks 
reduces ambiguity and variability in the subsequent steps of the framework. Leveraging 
existing USMC doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should serve as 
useful starting point for this analysis. 
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Table 1.   Team-Task Cognitive Analysis Framework Section 1 
 
The cognitive classification of the subtask in (1.b.) draws on the classification of 
cognitive tasks. Cohen (1996) considered classes of cognitive tasks that are hard input-
output rules, cognitive decision tasks that rely on established heuristics drawing on 
experience sets or training examples, and cognitive tasks that require cognitive creativity 
or imaginative extrapolation. Cohen’s terminology for classification is Rule-based, 
Knowledge-Based, and Creative Cognition. Step 1b informs analysis in Steps 1c, 2b, 2c, 
and 3e. 
Section 1. Task/Subtask Cognitive Factor Analysis 
Understand the task at hand as it relates to cognitive load 
Step 1a. Narrow the scope of 
 analysis 
Is the task defined at the right level of 
decomposition? 
Can the task be broken down into subtasks? 
Tools:  
Existing training materials or process descriptions, 
Business Process Flow Mapping,  
Work Breakdown Structure 
USMC Doctrine/TTPs 
Step 1b. Classify cognition in 
 the task 
What type of cognition or decision is happening in 
the task? 
Terms: 
Rule-based, Knowledge Based, Creative cognition 
(Cohen) 
Step 1c. Characterize the 
 task’s cognitive 
 complexity 
Terms:  
Deterministic vs Stochastic 
Binary vs Multivariate 
Well-defined vs Poorly Defined  
References: 
Chapter II Paragraphs H,I, and J 
Step 1d. Characterize the 
 task’s cognitive 
 environment 
Terms: 
Static vs Dynamic 
Sensory noise, distractors, stressors 
Urgency 
Outcome criticality high-stakes consequences 
Competing external and internal  
Tasks 
References: 
 Chapter II Paragraphs F and G 
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The second section of the TTCAF, Team Composition/Agent to Task Matching, 
guides the analysis of task functional allocation and team composition (see Table 2). 
Section 1’s outputs and the consideration of the characteristics of human, machine and 
team cognitive processes in Chapter II paragraph K inform the analysis conducted in 
Section 2. Agent-Task Suitability (Step 2a) and Team Composition (Step 2b) are parallel 
steps and may have some feedback effects on each other in the design phase as a change in 
the composition of the team or the availability of a given agent may change the capacity of 
another agent to manage their own task load. Agent-Team Performance Refinement 
(Step 2c) helps the framework user develop a set of approaches to improve the performance 
of human and machine agents in their primary tasks and in their participation in team 
cognition processes. Johnson’s (2014) Interdependence Analysis (IA) can be a useful 
reference in this area, since it often identifies subtasks that are best performed by machines 
and those best supported by humans. 
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Table 2.   Team-Task Cognitive Analysis Framework Section 2 
 
Agent-Task Suitability (Step 2a) considers the subtask at hand in the analysis and 
asks if the agent is capable, partially capable or incapable of performing the task. This does 
not demand that a given agent is necessarily assigned complete ownership of a task but is 
intended to assess if an agent can contribute value to any part of the task along the lines of 
Coactive Design (Johnson, 2014). Functional Allocation of tasks should be considered 
through Johnson’s Interdependence Analysis and Coactive Design after Section 3 of the 
Section 2. Team Composition/Agent to Task Matching 
Humans, Machines, One or Many? 
Step 2a. Agent-Task 
 Suitability 
 
Is the task aligned with human, machine, or combined 
sensory and perception traits? 
Consider the output of TTCAF Section 1 
Terms: 
Specialization/expertise, Context/Ambiguity, Complexity, 
fault tolerance, cognitive diversity, sensory diversity, 
cognitive processing rate.  
References: 
 Chapter II: Paragraph F, G 
Step 2b. Team 
 Composition 
 
Is the task suitable for teams or lone operators? 
Human – Machine, Human only, Machine only? 
Terms: 
Specialization/expertise, redundancy, workload distribution, 
fault tolerance, cognitive diversity, sensory diversity, 
cognitive processing rate, individual endurance, process 
frequency, stakes/consequence 
Is teaming composition based on precedent or inherited 
constructs?  
References: 
Chapter II: Paragraph H, I, J 




Human Agent performance improvements through Training, 
Education, SOPs, Process Redesign,  
Machine Agent Improvement through technology selection 
and engineering 
Term Performance enhancement through interface redesign, 
Process redesign, CRM training, Environmental 
(temperature, noise) controls 
References: 
Chapter II: Paragraph K 
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TTCAF informs an understanding of the coordination design of team processes. TTCAF 
Step 2a considers the potential quality of cognitive performance of a human or machine 
agent. Step 2a also considers the policy and social implications of assigning decision-
making authority involving ethical or moral decision to “unfeeling” machine agents or less 
rigorous human agents.  
Team Composition (Step 2b) asks the framework-user to consider if and why 
teaming is necessary. Teaming can deliver specialization and expertize as current human 
and machine agents have limits in their abilities for task specialization and general 
expertise. Any combination of agents, other than identical machine agent teams, provides 
cognitive diversity that can add value when performing complex or ambiguous tasks. For 
human agents, teaming is necessary for task persistence. The sensory diversity between 
human and machine agents is a valuable foil against the different sensory vulnerabilities 
that lead to deception of human and machine agents. These kinds of analyses, drawn from 
understanding factors described in Chapter II, will inform the design decisions around the 
agent-team composition. 
Agent Team Performance Enhancement (Step 2c) addresses design elements 
that can improve the performance of selected agents, based on the characteristic nature of 
the task and the cognitive process of the agent. Human agent performance improves with 
training, learned expertise, deliberate practice, and process design tailored to human 
cognition. Machine Agent performance improves with correct technology selection and 
technology improvements. Interface design is a critical element to consider when placing 
agents in a team environment, as poorly designed interfaces increase cognitive load and 
decrease speed and accuracy of shared information. The elements of Task Complexity 
(Step 1c) and Task Environment (Step 1d) are described in Chapter II, paragraph 2. Task 
Complexity and Task Environment affect human and machine agents differently and 
contribute to coordination complexity. Task Complexity analysis invokes the literature on 
Cognitive Load Theory, Situation Awareness and Decision Making (Chapter II, paragraphs 
H, I, and J) and includes terms such as information complexity and element interactivity. 
The Task Environment description considers how the operational environment impacts 
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perception and cognition (Chapter II, paragraphs F and G). A rigorous analysis in Steps 2c 
and 2d informs the design decision in Steps 2b, 2c, and 3b. 
Section 3 of the TTCAF, Team Coordination Demands and Mechanisms, uses 
the outputs of TTCAF section 1 and 2 as the basis for the analysis of the dynamics of team 
coordination (see Table 3). Team coordination activities include dynamic distribution and 
functional allocation of tasks and subtasks, integration of completed subtasks, information 
sharing processes, teammate monitoring, task progress evaluation, quality control, and 
error management, and are all necessary for the team to realize the performance benefits 
of operating as a collaborative group. The Coordination Mechanisms are the means through 
which the team communicates and interacts, and are described in Chapter II, paragraph K.  
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Table 3.   Team-Task Cognitive Analysis Framework Section 3 
Section 3. Team Coordination Demands and Mechanisms 
Understand & mitigate Coordination Cost of Human-Machine Layering & Sharing 
Step 3a. Analyze team’s 
 internal and external 
 coordination 
 mechanisms  
Does the added value of teaming outweigh the 
coordination cost of teaming? 
Does the team coordinate with external dependencies 
for this task? 
Terms and Concepts: 
Interdependence (Thompson) 
Interdependence Analysis (Johnson) 
Reference: 
Chapter II: Paragraph K 
Step 3b. Analyze team 
 coordination 
 performance  factors 
Identify factors that affect the team’s ability to share 
information and act. 
Concepts: 
Cost of Encoding and decoding information to share 
with teammates, monitoring teammate performance, 
maintaining mental models of teammate’s state and SA, 
waiting for teammate inputs, information transmission 
decay and loss 
Reference: 
Chapter II: Paragraph K 
Step 3c. Analyze 
 environment  impact 
 on functional 
 allocation factors 
Do changes in the operating environment change 
functional allocation within the team? 
Do environmental conditions limit the team’s ability to 
coordinate information and action? 
Reference: 
Chapter II: Paragraph H 
Step 3d. Failure Modes and 
 Management  
What are the likely failure modes and conditions? 
What are the high-consequence edge case failure modes 
and conditions? 
Can the team fail gracefully if an agent fails or is 
isolated? 
What modifications could add resilience to the team in 
failure conditions? 
Is the team resilient against task environment stressors? 
Terms and Concepts: 
Trust, teammate monitoring, OPD, error detection, 
Fault Tolerant Engineering 
Step 3e. Interface Design 
 and Experimentation 
Propose, Experiment and Iterate on suitable designs. 
Concepts: 
Part Task Analysis, Scenario based exercises 
Design Thinking, Virtual Environment, Live Testing 
Reference: 
Chapter II: Paragraph K 
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Analyze team internal and external coordination mechanisms (Step 3a) 
considers the team’s coordination mechanisms in the language of Thompson’s 
Interdependence and Johnson’s Independence Analysis. The rate and volume of interaction 
in the team speaks to the degree of interdependence in the team. Teams with high 
interdependence have higher coordination costs in mental effort as the increase in seeking 
and sharing teammate information and monitoring teammates adds to the agent’s mental 
load. Findings in Step 3a can feed back to Step 2c and increase or decrease the level of 
accommodation required to mitigate the coordination costs through measures that optimize 
coordination both intra-team and with external agents. 
Analyze team coordination performance factors (Step 3b) and Analyze 
environmental impact on functional allocation factors (Step 3c) examine the team in 
the operational environment to assess the effects of environmental stressors on team 
coordination and functional allocation of subtasks. The environmental stressors discussed 
in Chapter II that adversely impact human performance could drive functional allocation 
toward the machine agent in the team. Extreme environmental conditions may diminish the 
value of the human-machine interface, which could necessitate the redesign of a team 
process or an input-output device. Steps 3b and 3c rely heavily on exploration of Johnson’s 
OPD concepts and the engagement of domain expertise in describing and evaluating 
performance of a team performing the problem task. 
Failure Modes and Management (Step 3d) examines the team’s coordination and 
performance potential under failure scenarios. Optimal team design must allow for 
identification and recovery from spurious inputs, incorrect interpretations, loss of 
information in communication, and errant actions. The cognitive and sensory diversity in 
the team, role redundancy and verification in critical functions, communication 
confirmation and error correction, and teammate monitoring are examples of ways that a 
team can self-diagnose off-nominal conditions and return the team to a nominal operating 
state. As Johnson (2014) states in his discussion of Interdependence Analysis, designers 
and analysts should assume failures will happen and make considerations on how to adjust 
when they occur. 
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Interface Design and Experimentation (Step 3e) takes the ideas of design into 
iterative experimentation. Observation of agent teams working in tabletop exercises, 
Virtual Environments, and Operational environments represent increasing levels of fidelity 
for this phase. Partial task analysis of discrete subtasks allows detailed analysis of granular 
interactions while composed scenario-based experiments of the overarching mission take 
the analysis further to allow analysis of emergent behaviors that can supplement design 
decisions. 
I. TEAM-TASK COGNITIVE DIAGRAM 
The Team-Task Cognitive Diagram (TTCD) is a method to describe and 
communicate the relationship dynamics of the Task Characteristics, the Task Environment, 
and the Agent(s) performing the Task. The TTCAF does not assert a specific format or 
prescribe a level of detail of the analytical product, but TTCD is proposed as a useful tool 
for visualizing some of the TTCA relationships. Figure 14 shows the highest level 
abstraction of the TTCD. An expanded example of TTCD in support of TTCAF follows 
later in the chapter. 
 
Figure 14.  Team-Task Cognitive Diagram (TTCD) Tool. Adapted from 
Paas and Van Merriëboer (1994). 
 79 
The TTCD tool derives from Paas and Van Merriënboer’s model of cognitive load 
factors, including the work of Johnson et al.’s efforts on interdependence and coactive 
design. The TTCD tool explicitly breaks out the cognitive load factors unique to 
performing a task in a team environment. Additionally, the authors opted to breakout 
environment from task since the environment in which an individual or team performs a 
task is a critical factor that warrants distinct consideration. 
One could argue that team coordination factors are a part of the task or the task 
environment, however by breaking out the cognitive factors attributed to teaming, the 
framework’s user must explicitly consider both the task itself and the requirements to 
coordinate the task completion within the team dynamic. As a result, users of the TTCD 
tool can analyze and evaluate cognitive factors unique to the team dynamic such as 
communication and coordination requirements, interface design, trust, and OPD 
requirements. This proposed tool shows the baseline building blocks that a user can utilize 
to design a diagram of their specific use-case. Teaming cognitive factors are shown as a 
recursive factor to agent(s) capabilities. If the task is performed by a single agent and a 
team does not exist, then this recursive loop will not exist in the user’s use-case diagram. 
If the user employs multiple agents in the use-case, then the user should display each agent 
as an independent entity and the teaming cognitive factors will link between two agents. 
The authors demonstrate how to use the TTCD tool later in the chapter. 
J. ENTRY CONTROL POINT USE CASE EXAMPLE 
The TTCD provides the building blocks for users to develop a visual model of their 
specific use-case while the TTCAF is used to analyze the cognitive aspects of the case. 
This resulting model supports the evaluation of whether the proposed agent(s) composition 
and task alignment is cognitively optimized. The TTCD and TTCAF do not recommend a 
specific agent or team of agents to accomplish a specific task, but rather provide the 
structure for evaluating the agent-task-environment-team cognitive factors. A sample use-
case provides an example of how the authors envision using the model. 
The authors chose the task of guarding an entry control point (ECP) at a military 
base in a populated city located in a combat zone. The situation occurs in a highly complex 
 80 
and dynamic environment where significant consequences could result. Typically, Marines 
defend ECPs using guards in teams of at least two or more to provide internal security, 
backup, resiliency, and redundancy to the team. For simplicity, the use-case assumes that 
a team of two Marines represents the current standard. In this use-case example, the user 
is trying to determine the cognitive impact of augmenting the existing team with a machine 
teammate. 
1. TTCAF Section 1 
a. TTCAF Section 1 Analysis Process 
In Step 1a of the TTCAF, the authors analyzed the primary task of guarding an 
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Figure 15.  Team-Task Cognitive Diagram of Guarding ECP Task 
 
 81 
In Steps 1b and 1c of the framework, the authors characterized the type of cognitive 
task and the cognitive characteristics of each sub-task (see Figure 16). For brevity, the 
authors extended this analysis to only sub-task 1: Maintain SA on all personnel and 
vehicles in the ECP’s proximity. The authors assessed that this sub-task is knowledge-
based. It requires the agent to apply mental models, obtained through experience or 
training, and judgment to comprehend information about the environment to achieve Level 
II and Level III SA. The sub-task is stochastic because the task inputs are random. The 
authors assessed that the task has high cognitive complexity because the human agent 
performing the task must constantly update his or her comprehension of the situation by 
processing a significant number of information elements, apply mental models and context, 
and potentially update mental models as a result. Maintaining SA is a persistent and 
enduring task that requires constant attention and focus to identify and incorporate signals 
that the situation has altered, and to understand that change as soon as possible. A guard 
must constantly shift attention between the individual or vehicle they are screening, 
vehicles and individuals in the queue, approaching vehicles and individuals, and other 
potential influencers, produces a significant temporal pressure associated with performing 
this task. Failure to rapidly identify and incorporate situation changes into one’s decision 
making process could prevent the agent from having sufficient time to process the 
information and determine if something presents a threat. Significantly high consequences 
accompany failure to correctly identify a threat in a timely fashion. In the current construct, 
information inputs to this task include only what the human guard can physically perceive. 
The guards are not able to incorporate other information that will help them maintain SA.  
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Figure 16.  Cognitive Factors of ECP Guard Task 
Upon completing step 1d of the TTCAF, the authors analyzed the task 
environment’s cognitive factors (see Figure 17). The authors assessed that the task 
environment is dynamic and at times chaotic. The authors also identified other 
environmental factors, such as noise levels and climate control conditions that affect 
cognitive load. The environment also presents a persistent threat of injury or death to 
human agents. Lastly, the authors identified that the agent performing this sub-task would 
be completing other sub-tasks concurrently with this sub-task. 
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b. TTCAF Section 1 Analysis Output Summary of Maintain SA Subtask 
The output of Step 1a for the Maintain SA subtask includes: monitoring the 
environment, interacting with drivers and pedestrians at the ECP, referencing vehicle 
records of vehicles at the ECP, and sharing SA with adjacent ECPs. 
The output of Step 1b for the Maintain SA subtask spans rule-based cognition in 
the subtask of referencing vehicle records, and knowledge-based cognition in applying 
mental models of the environment, to assessing current threat levels. Creative Cognition in 
response to highly unusual or novel situations would likely be deferred to a higher 
authority. 
The authors previously discussed the outputs for Step 1c and Step 1d (Figures 16 
and 17, respectively). 
2. TTCAF Section 2 
a. TTCAF Section 2 Analysis Process 
Once the authors identified the cognitive factors of each of the task’s sub-tasks, and 
each sub-task’s environment, the user completed Step 2 of the TTCAF to determine how 
performing the task impacts human and machine cognitive load (see Figure 18). For the 
purposes of this case study, the Machine agent on the team is a notional currently available 
system that optically recognizes faces and searches multiple databases to verify identity 
and historical information about the individual. The Machine agent is capable of rapidly 
referencing the appropriate databases and flagging individuals with risk characteristics, 
such as organizational ties to enemy actors, terrorist organizations, or suspicions patterns 
of activity at other sites sharing the database. The Machine agent provides information on 
the individual’s status to the Human agents on a visual display. The Machine agent is 
assessed as highly reliable and highly accurate in facial recognition but accesses a database 
that is occasionally incomplete or erroneous. 
Maintaining a high level of SA will, at times, overload a human agent’s cognitive 
capabilities. For instance, an inexperienced Marine, who has never performed this task 
before, lacks the appropriate mental models from which to draw. The inexperienced Marine 
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will process information more slowly, will struggle to achieve high levels of SA, and will 
react to changes in the environment more slowly than when compared to an experienced 
Marine. The temporal pressure requirement of keeping SA constantly updated, or risk 
severe negative consequence to oneself or others, adds additional cognitive load to this 
sub-task. A human agent performing this task over a long period of time may experience 
cognitive fatigue resulting in reduced SA and slower processing rates. 
The sub-task and environmental cognitive factors have a different impact on a 
machine teammate. The machine teammate is not affected by the persistent and enduring 
nature of the task. From a computational speed standpoint, a machine agent is better-suited 
to handle the sub-task’s temporal pressure. High consequences of failure to perform the 
task and environmental considerations do not impact the machine agent’s performance. 
Similar to a human agent, the machine agent does have optimal levels of operating 
temperature and humidity, and its performance may degrade if operating outside of its 




Figure 18.  Impact of Task and Environment Factors on Human and 
Machine Agents 
As previously stated, this task is typically performed by at least two Marines to 
provide cognitive and perspective diversity, fault tolerance, and resiliency to task 
performance. This task is therefore not suitable for performance by individuals. The sub-
task is performed by each individual on the team. To achieve shared SA, the team members 
must coordinate to pass information to other teammates about their perception, 
comprehension, and projection of the environment.  
b. TTCAF Section 2 Analysis Output Summary 
Step 2a: The ECP Subtask 1 is suitable for teams. The high consequences of task 
failure and the added value of aggregated team vigilance and sensor diversity are the 
primary factors for recommending a team for this task. 
Machine Agent Cognitive Impact
Task 
Cognitive Factors Human Agent Cognitive Impact
Requires proper prior training of 
Machine Agent Knowledge-based
Cognitive abilities suitable 
depending on prior experience & 
training
Impacts cognitive load/ cognitive 
capabilities not well suited Stochastic
Requires judgment/contributes to 
cognitive load
Requires more advanced algorithms/ 
more powerful computing capabilities High cognitive complexity Contributes to cognitive load
Does not lead to cognitive fatigue Persistent and enduring task Leads to cognitive fatigue 
No impact to cognitive load High temporal pressure Contributes to cognitive load
No impact to cognitive load Significant negative consequences Contributes to cognitive load
Machine can fuse information and 
present to human for consumption Numerous sources of information
Can only process information 
perceived with organic sensors
Task Environment Cognitive 
Factors
Requires more advanced algorithms/ 
more powerful computing capabilities Highly Dynamic
Requires agent to allocate dedicated  
cognitive resources task 
No impact to cognitive load High risk of injury or death Contributes to cognitive load
No impact to cognitive load
Consistent moderate noise with 
random occasions of loud noise Contribute to cognitive load
Cognitive capabilities reduced if 
outside of operating limits
Environmental concerns such as 
temperature, lighting, dust, and 
humidity not controlled Contributes to cognitive load
May impact cognitive load depending 
on requirements Concurrent cognitive tasks
Cognitive resources must be 
allocated among cognitive tasks
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Step 2b: The human agents are most suitable for processing the ambiguous 
environmental cues and the human interaction necessary at the ECP. The Machine Agent 
is ideal for persistent, highly accurate, database referencing to contribute data fusion to the 
Team’s SA. 
Step 2c: Team Performance Enhancement for this subtask can be achieved by 
training the human agents to understand that the contribution of the Machine Agent is an 
accurate reference of the vehicle history, but that the humans will occasionally have to 
resolve ambiguous situations arising from the flawed database. Team Performance can also 
be enhanced by effective interface design of the Machine Agent output. Rather than simply 
providing a visual depiction of the vehicle database record that the ECP guard has to read 
in long form, the interface could activate an audio cue or a colored light within the normal 
field of vision off the ECP guard. This would allow the ECP to stay oriented on the vehicle 
and driver in normal conditions, rather than being drawn into a narrow focus on a detailed 
visual screen. When the Machine agent flags the system as suspect, a warning audio cue 
and different colored light notify the ECP guard to direct the vehicle to a secondary 
screening station. 
3. TTCAF Section 3 
a. TTCAF Section 3 Analysis Process 
TTCAF Step 3 builds on the processes and systems designed with Interdependence 
Analysis (IA) and Coactive Design (CD) through analysis of cognitive load incurred by 
the team relationships. Johnson’s et al.’s IA and CD provides a rigorous approach to 
understanding and designing the collaborative functional allocation, and provides 
techniques that should be used to thoroughly understand team task collaboration. IA and 
CD are not elaborated in this use-case, but are described clearly in Johnson et al.’s research. 
Figure 19 depicts an inset from Figure 15 that maps the collaboration pathways of agents 
on the team in the ECP use-case. The relationship elements of Observability, Predictability, 
and Directability essential to Coactive Design and Interdependence differ in (1) Human to 
Human, (2) Human to Machine, and (3) Machine to Human interaction. These interactions 









Figure 19.  ECP Agent to Agent Coordination Cognitive Load Diagram 
b. Human-Human Coordination 
In the ECP use-case example, the two human guards must coordinate their actions 
with each other to accomplish the task. Failure to properly coordinate could result in 
improper sub-task assignment and inability to mutually adjust. The human ECP guards 
coordinate their actions primarily through verbal and non-verbal communication. These 
mechanisms allow the guards to pass information, including individual intentions, sub-task 
assignment and updates, and when one guard gains new information about the environment 
that is important for the other guard to have. This coordination comes at a cost as each 
guard must monitor the other guard’s state and actions to ensure that the team is correctly 
postured. Prior training on the task and establishing standard operating procedures, which 
standardize meaning to verbal and non-verbal signals, makes coordination between the two 
guards more effortless cognitively. A shared sense of vulnerability and mutual concern 
increases trust between the two guards.  
c. Human-Machine Coordination 
For this example, the authors analyzed using a disembodied machine agent to gain 
situation awareness of individuals approaching the ECP. Current camera technology 
exceeds the human, but requires a human to watch the camera feed to interpret the image. 
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Combining camera technology with AI algorithms allows the team to offload the task of 
gaining SA on individuals in vicinity to the machine teammate. This capability frees the 
human guards to allocate their cognitive capacity to other aspects of the task. Increasing 
the number of cameras that machine teammate has access to could increase the number of 
tasks it can perform. The machine guard could concurrently monitor the human guards, 
virtually watching their backs, identifying their emotional state and providing cueing. 
Just as human teammates must maintain awareness about the state of their fellow 
human teammates, they must maintain awareness about the state of their machine 
teammate. Applying Johnson’s OPD, human teammates must know the machine 
teammate’s operational status and must know when the status changes. Human teammates 
must know when the machine teammate’s status changes from nominal to degraded or 
offline, so that the human teammates can adjust their task load to assume the tasks assigned 
to the machine. Additionally, the human guards must be able to direct the machine guard 
to investigate a specific individual or group of individuals that may concern the human 
guard. Communication in loops between the human and machine agents are the 
coordinating mechanism that allow human agents to share information about the state of 
the task and the state of the team. The reciprocal feedback is essential for flexible functional 
allocation of tasks in the dynamic environment, and reinforces the OPD bonds that human 
teams know as trust.  
The other key aspect to human-machine coordination is the method and manner 
that the information is communicated between teammates. Current mechanisms for 
humans to coordinate with and communicate information to machines are not as effortless 
as mechanisms to communicate with other humans. Historical interfaces such as keyboards 
and touchscreens required physical interaction. AI capabilities such as natural language 
processing and computer vision are new methods for providing information to and 
coordination with machines, without requiring the human to physically interact with the 
machine. For instance, natural language processing reduces the cognitive load of directing 
a Google maps app to provide navigation to a specific location. The driver can perform this 
task while concurrently driving the vehicle without having to take eyes off the road.  
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The human-machine interface is key to eliminating the extraneous cognitive load 
of communication between humans and machines. The presentation and format of 
information is key. When the machine passes information to the human guard, the human 
guard must allocate attention to perceive the information, decode the information presented 
by the interface, and then apply semantic and contextual meaning. The more semantic and 
contextual meaning incorporated into the interface, the less cognitive effort the human 
guard needs to apply. For instance, if the machine guard identifies an individual who 
matches a high value target list, or is acting suspicious, or poses some other threat to human 
guards, the machine guard must communicate this information to the human guards in a 
manner that the human guards can process and understand the meaning with the minimal 
amount of cognitive resources.  
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the authors analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of human and 
machine cognition. In certain cases, the strength of one cognition offsets the other’s 
cognitive weakness or gap. Done properly, teaming humans and machines can improve the 
cognitive performance of the team. Teaming humans and machines together is not without 
risks, however. Humans must be able to trust their machine teammates if the machine agent 
is to successfully contribute to the team’s cognitive performance. Currently, there are 
significant barriers to achieving this objective, such as the machine’s inability to explain 
how it arrived at an answer or recommendation the way a human can, and the machine’s 
lack of mutual concern and shared sense of vulnerability, which also makes it inherently 
less trustworthy. Another potential risk to teaming humans and machines lies in the 
interface design. Poorly designed non-intuitive interfaces risk overloading the human 
agent, resulting in cognitive overload through mere team coordination alone. The authors 
subsequently analyzed how cognitive performance can impact task performance through 
poor SA and decision-making. 
In this chapter’s second half, the authors synthesized the review of relevant 
literature, analysis of human and machine cognitive abilities, and the analysis of team 
coordination and risks, to propose the TTCAF and the TTCD and to assist users in 
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identifying and analyzing the relevant task and environmental cognitive factors to 
determine the team composition that optimizes the cognitive performance of a task. Finally, 
the authors demonstrated via an ECP use-case example how to use the TTCAF and the 
TTCD to perform a cognitive factor analysis. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
True computer literacy is not just knowing how to make use of computers 
and computational ideas. It is knowing when it is appropriate to do so. 
—Papert (1980, p. 155) 
 
This thesis aimed to increase understanding of how HMT impacts cognitive 
performance. The authors accomplished this by thoroughly reviewing the relevant 
literature on machine intelligence, human cognition, situation awareness, decision making, 
and teaming, then applying that background to analyze the relevant factors that contribute 
to cognitive load. As a result, the authors developed a framework that aims to assist in 
identifying which team construct optimizes the cognitive load and, by extension, team 
performance. This chapter discusses research conclusions, recommendations for industry 
and the military, and recommendations for future research. 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS  
1. Autonomy Taxonomy, Ontology, and Definition Standardization 
While academia and industry have worked toward creating intelligent machines for 
centuries, AI capability has been significantly expanded in recent years. As a result, the 
number of terms relating to the field has also grown dramatically. Many of these terms 
appear to overlap or conflict with each other. The AI community, including both civilian 
industry and the military, have yet to agree and standardize what terms should be used, 
how the terms relate to each other, and their respective definitions. This lack of 
standardization inhibits effective and efficient communication, is a barrier to 
understanding, and sows the seeds of failed expectations. Since failure to achieve 
expectations is the root of disappointment, and disappointment is the precursor to distrust, 
it is important that the end user has realistic expectations and understanding of what AI can 
and cannot do. 
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2. Robotics, AI, and Cognitive Load 
Robotics and AI are two related but separate disciplines that users often conflate. 
A robot may or may not need or possess AI capabilities while an AI capability may or may 
not require robotic capabilities. Robotics provide solutions to physical problems, such as 
surgical precision requirements and human physical strength or endurance limitations, 
while AI provides solutions to cognitive problems. While robotics may solve certain 
problems, they may also complicate the cognitive load of humans. The authors do not 
advocate maximizing cognitive performance at the expense of other factors of 
performance, but rather advocate for optimizing cognitive load.  
3. Optimizing AI Use 
Current DoD strategic concepts, such as the Marine Corps Security Environment 
Forecast (MCSEF) Futures 2030–2045, invoke a future where AI will operate isolated from 
humans and without human input or supervision in a manner similar to Thompson’s pooled 
interdependence. Many who posit this approach concentrate on the cognitive limitations of 
humans as the reason for this future relationship. These strategic concepts, however, ignore 
the inherent machine AI limitations and the unique human cognitive benefits as they relate 
to dynamic environments such as combat operations. 
While using only AI to perform a task is one potential solution, it may not be the 
optimal solution to a given problem. The concept of full or complete autonomy does not 
exist in humans or in machines. Humans and machines both have limitations and must rely 
on another agent at some point. Since AI is cognitively limited in that it possesses a narrow 
scope of expertise and lacks context, teaming AI with humans may offer a more robust, 
flexible, and fault-tolerant capability in certain applications. Users must consider the 
cognitive nature of the task and the environment to determine what cognitive construct 
presents the optimal choice. 
4. Trust, Communication, and Interface Design 
For human-machine teams to be effective, the cognitive load of each, specifically 
the human component of the team, must be optimized. Hence, the optimal human-machine 
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team solutions cannot be the product of only great AI engineering and design, but must 
incorporate human cognitive factors. The research identifies trust and interface design as 
two prominent factors. Poorly-designed interfaces inhibit effortless information transfer 
and require the human to expend unnecessary cognitive resources to decode and apply 
meaning. HMT requires intuitive means of communication between the team members that 
satisfies OPD requirements. Improving the interface design reduces the cognitive load that 
communicating imparts on each team member. 
Increasing trust between teammates is an aspect of cognitive load that future 
designers must consider. When team members share information, the receiver must 
determine whether to trust the information and, by extension, the sender. Humans will have 
difficulty trusting an AI agent that is incapable of explaining how and why it arrived at a 
given conclusion. Hence, humans will have to rely on past experience with the AI 
teammate to determine if they can trust the AI and the information it communicates.  
B. INSTITUTIONAL / INDUSTRIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding research findings motivate the recommendations to DoD that follow. 
Institutional and industry-level consensus is necessary to address the issues of the 
inconsistent state of autonomy semantics, broad under-appreciation of cognitive load 
theory in teaming, an incomplete understanding of HMT dynamics, and unrealistic 
expectations of autonomous technology. The authors present the recommendations in three 
parts, beginning with educating the stakeholders in HMT concepts, then applying the new 
understanding to HMT design, followed by recommendations to continue efforts to refine 
the art and science of the technology and human elements of HMT.  
1. HMT Language, Concepts, and Vision Education 
The DoD and industry need to develop and disseminate a common understanding 
of autonomy and HMT concepts. The DoD should develop and adopt clear language and 
definition of terms, and clarify the ideas and concepts in the autonomy and HMT domain. 
Unambiguous language and authoritative concept documents then can underpin subsequent 
DoD efforts to educate stakeholders on Autonomy and Teaming concepts to achieve 
desired outcomes in cognitive performance and improve the decisions of human team 
 94 
members. Shared language, realistic expectations, and a clear strategy for DoD’s 
Autonomy and HMT community are essential to unify research and development (R&D) 
and operational initiatives and avoid redundant, off-target, and even self-defeating lines of 
effort.  
The DoD should emphasize HMT education at all levels in the organization. The 
DoD should develop and disseminate joint terminology and concepts to define the language 
industry and the services use to describe, understand and communicate autonomy and 
teaming principles. The current doctrine and DoD publications pertaining to HMT issues 
lack an authoritative lineage and are often inadequate for describing the nuance and details 
of HMT issues. A shared language of descriptive terms and clear concepts could provide 
the framework for describing HMT issues and ideas, and is an essential precursor to sharing 
and communicating HMT ideas. These HMT ideas would be shared across a spectrum of 
education and targeted across tactical operators, support staff, and all the way up to General 
Staff Officers. Educating strategists and senior leaders is necessary so that the individuals 
who influence and develop strategy and policy have a thorough, grounded understanding 
of HMT concepts. HMT Education at the operational and tactical levels is necessary for 
users to understand the dynamics of the HMT interaction and effectively use their teamed 
assets. DoD Requirements and Capabilities developers and acquisition professionals need 
to understand HMT so that they develop requirements for HMT and acquire systems 
optimized for HMT use. The DoD should also develop and employ common frameworks 
such as TTCAF to improve the development process, so systems and process are subject 
to a common analytical language. 
2. HMT Design and Implementation Strategy 
The common HMT semantics detailed above are necessary for the community to 
develop an enlightened HMT strategy that can fully reap the benefits of HMT. Armed with 
a clear vision for Autonomy and a shared understanding of HMT capability and 
technology, the DoD should develop, deliver, and continue to update a holistic HMT 
strategy, vision, and policy, that goes beyond the current narrowly focused Unmanned 
Systems Roadmap plans and the kind of Autonomous systems future vision suggested in 
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the MCSEF 2030-2045 (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, 2015). Unmanned Systems 
strategies that seek to deliver fully autonomous systems for independent machine 
operations as simple substitutes lack the whole picture approach that HMT and coactive 
design accommodate (Bradshaw et al., 2013). To create HMT systems that do not adversely 
affect human operator cognitive load, DoD strategy must consider HMT with 
interdependence, team interface concepts, and dynamically shared functional allocation as 
central concepts. 
Innovation and policy can easily end up pitted against each other. Innovation, by 
definition, needs space to maneuver within and eventually advance policy. Policy dictates 
process and structure, which can be a barrier to innovation. Without policy to organize the 
overall trajectory and create lines of communication between R&D initiatives and 
operational activities, the DoD risks redundancy and waste, and misses the opportunity for 
collaborative, cumulative wins. The DoD HMT policy must have flexibility and channels 
for change, but enough structure so that researchers and operational activities have 
visibility across the enterprise, and must leverage the efficiency of shared learning and 
resources.  
Above all else, the HMT Policy should focus on operational performance and 
developing strategic advantage. As a component of the Third Offset Strategy, Autonomy 
leveraged through HMT concepts must add value to National Security. The DoD should 
employ HMT when its employment adds value that outweighs the burdens incurred by 
introducing the technology.  
3. Pursue Diversified Research and Development Portfolio Efforts (ML 
versus Expert Systems) 
There is no golden path to success in HMT or master algorithm that will solve the 
infinite range of use-cases the DoD faces. The rapid pace of change and discovery across 
the various branches of AI and cognitive research, and emerging but unproven interface 
technology such as Virtual Reality or wearable sensors, give little indication as to which 
R&D efforts the Marines should take. The DoD should not fixate on any one technical 
solution based on narrow use-case success, in the hope that heavy investment in a narrow 
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area can generalize to solve a broad problem set. For example, Machine Learning AI’s 
impressive ability in pattern recognition based on tagged data does not add value in 
problems where well-tagged datasets are not available or where the system must be able to 
communicate the internal process. Rule-based expert systems are reliable and predictable 
within their designs constraint, but require that every operational situation they encounter 
is planned and engineered in detail. Even as the branch efforts of AI research improve 
Machine cognitive performance, the dynamics of HMT will still confound the process, and 
those HMT dynamics are also worthy of specific R&D. 
The DoD R&D portfolio should reflect the diverse range of factors that feed into 
HMT performance. The unmanned systems research portfolio should continue the current 
pursuit of AI performance improvement, advances in robotic control systems, and 
improved power storage and efficiency for untethered systems. The HMT research 
portfolio should complement the unmanned systems research with increased efforts in 
advancing understanding of human cognitive psychology, human-machine interface 
design, and developing tools for experimentation. Human cognitive psychology research 
focused on team cognition and trust would inform the design of interfaces, HMT processes, 
and team design. Interface design, specifically for HMT application, merits a line of 
research to optimize performance. Research on human-machine interaction, interface 
design, and team trust should focus on Dekker and Woods’ question, “How do we make 
them work together?” (Dekker and Woods, 2002, abstract). 
Human cognition and human-machine interface R&D would benefit from an 
improved experimentation toolset to enable the recommendation of the Defense Science 
Board to experiment and prototype autonomy technology (Defense Science Board, 2016b). 
Virtual worlds where researchers could explore and experiment on human subject 
cognition and rapidly iterate without waiting for the physical delivery of advanced robotic 
systems, or coordination with large-scale military exercises, would allow researchers to 
remove lag and delay time in their research and tailor the experimental environment to 
isolate variables in the research.  
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Digital twin approaches that place experimental systems parallel to, rather than in 
the human-team decision loop, represent an opportunity for humans to observe the 
cognitive output of potential machine teammates in parallel. Placing machine agents 
without the capacity for action in operational settings with humans would provide an 
experimental platform for researchers to observe human-machine interaction and for 
human operators to begin to set expectations, build trust, and understand the potential of 
machine teammates. Leveraging virtual worlds and digital twins allows researchers to 
advance cognitive and interface research efforts without having to rely on mature robotics 
or communications technology. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Human-Machine Interface Improvement 
The cost of coordination is one of the greatest costs of teaming. To maximize the 
benefits of teaming machines with humans, minimizing these coordination costs is critical. 
For human-machine teams, the HMI design is the key contributor of coordination cost. 
Research that analyzes current HMI technology and standards and proposes new HMI 
standards and approaches that make future HMIs more intuitive and effective, and reduces 
cognitive load and coordination costs, would benefit numerous applications and industries.  
2. Standardized HMT Data Models and Language 
Two components that underpin human-machine interaction are data models and 
language. There is a need to develop shared and standardized data models that allow both 
humans and machines to convey, perceive, and interpret standardized language and 
symbolism. For instance, a human-machine team leader should be able to develop and brief 
a single patrol order using standardized language and data modeling to team members and 
have both human and machine agents comprehend the order. If the team leader must build 
separate patrol orders for humans and machine agents, then the benefits of teaming are 
diminished due to increased coordination costs. Standardized language and data models 
are important not only in planning. In the ECP example discussed in Chapter IV, 
incongruent language and data constructs may lead to mission failure. Air traffic control 
(ATC) demonstrates how using standardized language during radio transmissions to 
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minimize pilot and controller cognitive load avoids communication and SA errors. Because 
transmissions use standardized language and standardized reporting formats, ATC could 
integrate machine agent teammates more easily than if its language was not standardized. 
Research that leverages advances in natural language processing and computer vision, and 
explores how to build a standardized language for both machines and humans, could assist 
in reducing the cognitive load of both agent types that results from coordination. 
3. DoD AI Strategy and Vision 
Current DoD AI concepts and visions seek to employ AI for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as in applications deemed too dangerous for 
humans. The authors believe that, done correctly, the benefits of human-machine teaming 
outweigh the costs in many other applications as well. Future research should analyze the 
role of AI in the DoD. This research should identify high-return opportunities to apply AI 
that the DoD is not currently considering. This research should not just consider combat 
applications, as there might be numerous opportunities in administrating, training, and 
equipping the force that will benefit from AI. 
4. TTCAF / TTCD Improvement 
As previously mentioned, the authors were unable to test the model’s merits and 
usability. Additionally, the authors recommend that future research applies the model to a 
specific use-case to evaluate and propose modifications to improve the model. 
Additionally, the model is rudimentary in its current form. The authors acknowledge that 
designing to a specific use-case by hand is a cognitively intensive process, and the model 
in its current form needs refinement to make it more intuitive and easy to use. Therefore, 
the authors recommend that future research develop a computer program that facilitates 
more intuitive use-case design and evaluation. Lastly, future research could seek to develop 
an all-inclusive list of task, environment, agent, and team cognitive factors to increase the 
framework’s usability. 
HMT must deliver improved performance or it is a wasted effort. Exotic machine 
intelligence and robotic systems delivering advanced capabilities risk creating adverse 
team performance outcomes if the humans they support do not trust, understand or 
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effectively engage with the technology. Human-machine teaming dynamics influenced by 
agent cognition, interface design, and functional allocation should be an equal 
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APPENDIX A.  GLOSSARY 
Autonomy: “the extent to which a system can carry out its own processes and operations 
without external control” (Beer et al., 2014). 
Autonomous weapon system. “A weapon system that, once activated, can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-
supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to 
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further 
human input after activation” (DoD, 2017a). 
Autonomous operation: “In air defense, the mode of operation assumed by a unit after it 
has lost all communications with higher echelons forcing the unit commander to assume 
full responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets” (DoD, 2017c).  
Semi-autonomous weapon system: 
A weapon system that, once activated, is intended to only engage individual 
targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human 
operator. This includes:  
• Semi-autonomous weapon systems that employ autonomy for engagement-
related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking, and 
identifying potential targets; cueing potential targets to human operators; 
prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or providing terminal 
guidance to home in on selected targets, provided that human control is 
retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific target 
groups for engagement.  
• “Fire and forget” or lock-on-after-launch homing munitions that rely on 
TTPs to maximize the probability that the only targets within the seeker’s 
acquisition basket when the seeker activates are those individual targets or 
specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator. (DoD, 
2017a) 
Human-supervised autonomous weapon system: “An autonomous weapon system that 
is designed to provide human operators with the ability to intervene and terminate 
engagements, including in the event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels 
of damage occur” (DoD, 2017a).  
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APPENDIX B.  TAXONOMIES OF AUTONOMOUS CONTROL 
Table 4.   Levels of Autonomous Control. Source: Sheridan and 
Verplank (1978). 
1 Human does the whole job up to the point of turning it over to the computer 
2 Computer helps by determining the options 
3 Computer helps determine options and suggests one, which human need not follow. 
4 Computer selects action and human may or may not do it. 
5 Computer selects action and implements it if human approves 
6 Computer selects action, informs human in plenty of time to stop it. 
7 Computer does the whole job and necessarily tells the human what it did. 
8 Computer does whole job and tells human what it did only if human explicitly asks 
9 Computer does whole job and tells human what it did and it, the computer, decides 
he should be told. 
10 Computer does whole job if it decides it should be done, and if so tells human, if it 
decides he should be told. 




Table 6.   Hierarchy of Levels of Automation. Source: Parasuraman 
et al. (2000). 
1 (low) The computer offers no assistance, human must take all decisions and 
actions 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or 
3 Narrows the selection down to a few, or 
4 Suggests one alternative, and 
5 Executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
6 Allows the human a restricted veto time before automatic execution 
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and 
8 Informs the human only if asked, or 
9 Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to 








Table 7.   NHTSA’s Accepted Model of Vehicle Automation. Source: 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2016). 
Levels of 
Automation Who Does What, When 
Level 0 The human driver does all the driving. 
Level 1 An advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) on the vehicle can sometimes 
assist the human driver with either steering or braking/accelerating, but not 
both simultaneously. 
Level 2 An advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) on the vehicle can itself 
actually control both steering and braking/accelerating simultaneously under 
some circumstances. The human driver must continue to pay full attention 
(“monitor the driving environment”) at all times and perform the rest of the 
driving task. 
Level 3 An Automated Driving System (ADS) on the vehicle can itself perform all 
aspects of the driving task under some circumstances. In those circumstances, 
the human driver must be ready to take back control at any time when the 
ADS requests the human driver to do so. In all other circumstances, the 
human driver performs the driving task. 
Level 4 An Automated Driving System (ADS) on the vehicle can itself perform all 
driving tasks and monitor the driving environment – essentially, do all the 
driving – in certain circumstances. The human need not pay attention in those 
circumstances. 
Level 5 An Automated Driving System (ADS) on the vehicle can do all the driving in 
all circumstances. The human occupants are just passengers and need never 
be involved in driving. 
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